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Over the last 7 years, there has been an alarming increase in the number of opioid 
overdose fatalities in Jefferson County, Kentucky. The increase has occurred despite 
Kentucky’s passage of a prescription drug monitoring program (PDMP) as defined by 
House Bill 1 (HB1) in 2012. Following the passage of Kentucky’s PDMP, heroin and 
fentanyl surpassed other prescription drugs as the most identified drugs in overdose 
deaths in Kentucky. Little is known about how the implementation of a PDMP influences 
the overall opioid overdose fatality rate. The purpose of this quantitative research, using a 
quasi-experimental design, was to evaluate the relationship between the implementation 
of Kentucky’s PDMP and a documented rise in heroin and fentanyl overdose fatalities. 
Rational choice theory was the theoretical framework for this study. Data regarding 
prescribing rates and opioid mortality rates were collected from an online database 
published by the Centers for Disease Control. Interrupted time-series analyses were used 
to analyze the data. Regarding prescription opioids, heroin, and synthetic opioids, results 
indicated that overall opioid fatality rates increased dramatically after the implementation 
of HB1. The results of this study provide increased knowledge for policymakers, which 











MS, University of Louisville, 2015 
BS, University of Louisville, 2008 
 
 
Doctoral Dissertation Submitted in Partial Fulfillment 
of the Requirements for the Degree of  










Table of Contents 
List of Tables .......................................................................................................................v 
List of Figures .................................................................................................................... vi 
Chapter 1: Introduction to the Study ....................................................................................1 
Introduction ....................................................................................................................1 
Problem Statement .........................................................................................................3 
Purpose ...........................................................................................................................7 
Significance....................................................................................................................8 
Rational Choice Theory .................................................................................................9 
Research Questions ......................................................................................................11 
Nature of the Study ......................................................................................................12 
Possible Types and Sources of Data ............................................................................14 
Importance of This Study.............................................................................................14 
Summary ......................................................................................................................14 
Chapter 2: Literature Review .............................................................................................16 
Introduction ..................................................................................................................16 
Framework ...................................................................................................................19 
A Brief History of Opioids ..........................................................................................20 
Prescription Opioid Diversion .....................................................................................25 
PDMP ..........................................................................................................................27 
Unintended Consequences of PDMP ...........................................................................29 
 
ii 
The Gateway Question: Does Prescription Opioid Addiction Lead to Heroin 
Use?..................................................................................................................30 
Withdrawal Avoidance ................................................................................................32 
Fentanyl........................................................................................................................33 
Social Implications.......................................................................................................34 
Economic Implications ................................................................................................38 
Political Implications ...................................................................................................40 
Gap in Literature ..........................................................................................................42 
Summary ......................................................................................................................43 




Target Population .........................................................................................................48 
Data Analysis Plan .......................................................................................................52 
Threats to Validity .......................................................................................................52 
Ethical Procedures .......................................................................................................53 
Summary ......................................................................................................................53 
Chapter 4: Application to Professional Practice and Implications for Social 
Change ...................................................................................................................55 
Introduction ..................................................................................................................55 




Research Question 1a: Have Opioid Prescribing Rates Decreased After the 
Implementation of Kentucky’s HB1? ....................................................... 57 
Research Question 1b: Have Arrest Rates for Possession of Heroin and 
Synthetic Opioids Increased After the Implementation of 
Kentucky’s HB1? ...................................................................................... 58 
Research Questions 1d Through 1g ...................................................................... 60 
Analysis Methods.................................................................................................. 62 
Research Questions 1d Through 1g ...................................................................... 63 
Analysis Methods for Objective 1 ........................................................................ 65 
Analysis Methods for Objective 2 ........................................................................ 68 
Assumptions of Time-Series Analysis .................................................................. 69 
Analysis Results .................................................................................................... 70 
Analysis Results for Objective 1..................................................................................82 
ITS Analysis of Prescribing Rate .......................................................................... 82 
ITS Analysis of Mortality of Opioids ................................................................... 85 
ITS Analysis of Mortality of Heroin and Synthetic Opioids ................................ 88 
Analysis Results of Objective 2 ............................................................................ 91 
Summary ......................................................................................................................97 
Chapter 5: Interpretation, Recommendations, and Implications .....................................101 
Introduction ................................................................................................................101 








Appendix A ......................................................................................................................125 





List of Tables 
Table 1: Data of the Study ................................................................................................ 62 
Table 2: Example Data Format for ITS Analysis ............................................................. 68 
Table 3. ACFs and PACFs for the Three Time Series Variables ..................................... 74 
Table 4. Data of the Study (Original Scale and Lag 1 Differences) ................................. 77 
Table 5. ACFs and PACFs for the Three Time Series Variables (Lag 1 Differences) ..... 80 
Table 6. Results of ITS Analysis of Prescribing Rate ...................................................... 83 
Table 7. ACFs and PACFs for the Residuals .................................................................... 84 
Table 8. Results of ITS Analysis of Mortality of Opioids ................................................ 86 
Table 9. ACFs and PACFs for the Residuals .................................................................... 87 
Table 10. Results of ITS Analysis of Mortality of Heroin and Synthetic Opioids ........... 89 
Table 11. ACFs and PACFs for the Residuals .................................................................. 90 
Table 12. Results of Bivariate Analyses ........................................................................... 93 
Table 13. Results of Shapiro-Wilk Tests .......................................................................... 94 
Table 14. ACFs and PACFs for the Residuals .................................................................. 96 
Table A1. Results of ITS Analysis of Mortality of Opioids ........................................... 125 
Table A2. Results of Shapiro-Wilk Tests ....................................................................... 125 
Table A3. ACFs and PACFs for the Residuals ............................................................... 127 
Table B1. Results of ITS Analysis of Mortality of Opioids ........................................... 130 
Table B2. Results of Shapiro-Wilk tests ......................................................................... 130 




List of Figures 
Figure 1. Yearly prescribing rates for Jefferson County, Kentucky. ................................ 58 
Figure 2. Jefferson County arrests for possession of heroin and synthetic opioids. ......... 59 
Figure 3. Jefferson County arrests for trafficking heroin and synthetic opioids. ............. 60 
Figure 4. Sequence of prescribing rate over time (The dash line represents the occurrence 
of the intervention) .................................................................................................... 71 
Figure 5. Sequence of mortality of opioids over time (The dash line represents the 
occurrence of the intervention) ................................................................................. 72 
Figure 6. Sequence of mortality of heroin and synthetic opioids over time (The dash line 
represents the occurrence of the intervention) .......................................................... 73 
Figure 7: Figures of ACFs (right) and PACFs (left) for prescribing rate ......................... 75 
Figure 8. Figures of ACFs (right) and PACFs (left) for mortality of opioids .................. 75 
Figure 9. Figures of ACFs (right) and PACFs (left) for mortality of heroin and synthetic 
opioids ....................................................................................................................... 75 
Figure 10. Sequence of prescribing rate over time (Lag 1 differences) (The dash line 
represents the occurrence of the intervention) .......................................................... 78 
Figure 11. Sequence of mortality of opioids over time (Lag 1 differences) (The dash line 
represents the occurrence of the intervention) .......................................................... 78 
Figure 12. Sequence of mortality of heroin and synthetic opioids over time (Lag 1 
differences) (The dash line represents the occurrence of the intervention) .............. 79 
Figure 13. Figures of ACFs (right) and PACFs (left) for prescribing rate (Lag 1 
differences) ............................................................................................................... 81 
 
vii 
Figure 14. Figures of ACFs (right) and PACFs (left) for mortality of opioids (Lag 1 
differences) ............................................................................................................... 81 
Figure 15. Figures of ACFs (right) and PACFs (left) for mortality of heroin and synthetic 
opioids (Lag 1 differences) ....................................................................................... 82 
Figure 16. Plot of standardized residuals and predicted values ........................................ 84 
Figure 17. Figures of ACFs (right) and PACFs (left) for the residuals ............................ 85 
Figure 18. Plot of standardized residuals and predicted values ........................................ 87 
Figure 19: Figures of ACFs (right) and PACFs (left) for the residuals ............................ 88 
Figure 20. Plot of standardized residuals and predicted values ........................................ 90 
Figure 21: Figures of ACFs (right) and PACFs (left) for the residuals ............................ 91 
Figure 22. scatter plot of lag 1 differences of mortality of opioids and lag 1 differences of 
prescribing rate.......................................................................................................... 93 
Figure 23. scatter plot of lag 1 differences of mortality of heroin and synthetic opioids 
and lag 1 differences of prescribing rate ................................................................... 93 
Figure 24. Plot of standardized residuals and predicted values (DV = Lag 1 differences of 
mortality of opioids) ................................................................................................. 95 
Figure 25. Plot of standardized residuals and predicted values (DV = Lag 1 differences of 
mortality of heroin and synthetic opioids) ................................................................ 95 
Figure 26. Figures of ACFs (right) and PACFs (left) for the residuals (DV = Lag 1 
differences of mortality of opioids) .......................................................................... 97 
Figure 27. Figures of ACFs (right) and PACFs (left) for the residuals (DV = Lag 1 
differences of mortality of heroin and synthetic opioids) ......................................... 97
1 
 
Chapter 1: Introduction to the Study 
Introduction 
The United States is in the midst of an opioid epidemic (United States Department 
of Health and Human Services [H.H.S.], n.d.a). Jefferson County, Kentucky is among 
Kentucky counties that have been hardest hit by the epidemic. The Kentucky Office of 
the State Medical Examiner (n.d.) reported that the most common category of deaths 
statewide in 2016 was drug related deaths. Drug related deaths accounted for 35% of all 
deaths. Drug related deaths were followed by gunshot wounds at 18.9%, nearly half the 
number of deaths caused by drugs. Of those drug-related deaths, opioids were, by far, the 
largest class of drugs detected. Opioids accounted for 44.56% of drug-related deaths 
followed by benzodiazepines at only 16.44% of drug related deaths statewide in 2016 
(Office of the State Medical Examiner, n.d.). 
 The Kentucky General Assembly passed House Bill 1 (HB1) in 2012 to reduce 
the number of prescription drug related deaths. HB1 defined a Prescription Drug 
Monitoring Program (PDMP) as having the purpose of monitoring prescribing habits and 
sharing prescription information among health care providers. One expected consequence 
of implementing the PDMP was to decrease the amount of prescription drugs available 
for diversion to the illicit market and, therefore, decrease the number of prescription drug 
related deaths in Kentucky. Little is known about how the implementation of Kentucky’s 
PDMP might have affected overdose deaths related to non-prescription opioids, 
specifically heroin and synthetic opioids (Kentucky General Assembly, 2012). 
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 This research examines the possibility that recent documented increases in heroin 
and synthetic opioid fatality rates are related to the implementation of Kentucky’s PDMP. 
The target populations for this study was people who were arrested for opioid-related 
violations and people who died from opioid-related overdose in Jefferson County, 
Kentucky between the years of 2007 and 2017. The findings in this study provide 
valuable information to policymakers who are tasked with implementing programs to 
address drug related problems. The findings in this study provide policymakers with 
valuable information for consideration to spark positive social change. Ultimately, the 
implications for positive social change are measured in a decrease in opioid overdose 
fatality rates and lives saved. 
 The purpose of this research was to examine the relationship between the 
implementation of Kentucky’s PDMP and the recent increase in heroin and synthetic 
opioid related fatality rates using a rational choice theoretical approach. Current research 
indicates that cost, availability and purity of available heroin are the primary drivers of a 
decision to switch from prescription opioid abuse to heroin use (Mars, Bourgois, 
Karandinos, Montero, & Ciccarone, 2014; Unick, Rosenblum, Mars, & Ciccarone, 2014).  
Although price and availability have been found to be the primary considerations 
in making the choice to switch to heroin and synthetic opioid use, withdrawal symptom 
avoidance sometimes becomes the primary reason for the choice once a prescription drug 
abuser has already become addicted to opioids (Mars et al., 2014). Using these 
assumptions, the current study conducts various time series regression analyses assigning 
the year 2012, when Kentucky implemented a PDMP, as the primary choice point in time 
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and independent variable. In this study, dependent variables measuring overdose fatality 
rates were used with the identification of various drugs present at the time of death to 
quantify any significant relationships. 
Problem Statement 
 Kentucky is ranked among the top 10 states in the nation for opioid-related 
overdose fatality rates (NIDA, 2018). Until recent years, the drug overdose problem in 
Kentucky was primarily the result of the misuse of various prescription drugs (Office of 
the State Medical Examiner, n.d.). Jefferson County, Kentucky has a problem with opioid 
overdose fatalities (Jefferson County Coroner’s Office, 2018). Prescription opioids have 
been a major contributor to opioid overdose fatality statistics in Jefferson County, 
Kentucky (Office of the State Medical Examiner, n.d.).  
The prescription opioid problem has not, however, been unique to Jefferson 
County, Kentucky. According to the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC, 
2017), PDMPs have been created to address the prescription drug problem nationwide. 
The CDC (2017, para. 3) stated that PDMPs are “among the most promising state-level 
interventions” for addressing the prescription drug abuse problem.  
In response to Kentucky’s prescription drug overdose problem, the Kentucky 
General Assembly passed Kentucky’s PDMP, as defined in HB1 in 2012 (Kentucky 
General Assembly, 2012). The intent of Kentucky’s PDMP was to reduce prescription 
drug misuse by monitoring prescribing and dispensing practices and sharing information 
among prescription drug providers (Kentucky General Assembly, 2012).  
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Prescription opioids are among the prescription drugs that are monitored by 
PDMPs. Opioids are drugs that are either made from the opium poppy plant or created 
synthetically in legitimate or clandestine labs (National Institute on Drug Abuse [NIDA], 
n.d.). A primary medical purpose for opioids is pain management (NIDA, n.d.). 
Prescription opioids have historically played a significant role in the overall prescription 
drug overdose problem in Kentucky (Office of the State Medical Examiner, n.d.). 
Prescription opioids present a unique problem for addressing prescription drug misuse 
because opioids are not only legitimate and highly effective pain management 
medications but they are also addictive and desirable for drug dealers and misusers 
(NIDA, n.d.; Volkow, 2014).  
Misuse of prescription opioids can ultimately lead to overdose incidents and death 
(Office of the State Medical Examiner, n.d.; Volkow, 2014). Prescription opioids can be 
found in the illicit market because they are diverted from licit to illicit use (White, Ready, 
& Katz, 2016). For the purpose of this study, prescription opioid diversion will be 
narrowly defined as when someone misuses prescription opioids that were prescribed for 
someone else. 
Despite the implementation of Kentucky’s PDMP, overall drug overdose fatality 
rates in Kentucky have continued to climb (Office of the State Medical Examiner, n.d.). 
Heroin and synthetic opioid use, primarily fentanyl, appear to be at least partially to 
blame for the increase in drug overdose fatality statistics in Jefferson County, Kentucky 
(Office of the State Medical Examiner, n.d.). The presence of opioids like heroin and 
fentanyl further complicates efforts to decrease drug overdose fatalities. Heroin is an 
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illicit opioid that is made from morphine, the natural substance found in the poppy plant 
(NIDA, n.d.). Heroin is used as a recreational drug for its intoxicating effects (NIDA, 
n.d.).  
Fentanyl is a synthetic opioid that has medical purposes but is also created in 
illicit drug labs for illicit use (NIDA, n.d.). Heroin and Fentanyl that are created in 
clandestine labs cannot be regulated by PDMPs. An alarming finding for Kentuckians is 
that fentanyl, alone or in combination with heroin, was identified in 47% of all drug 
overdose fatalities in Kentucky in 2016 (Tilley & Ingram, n.d.).  
Morphine was the most detected drug in overdose fatalities by the medical 
examiner in 2016. The detection of morphine can indicate either a morphine overdose or 
a heroin overdose. Heroin presents as morphine after it is metabolized by the body. This 
complicates the true measure of heroin’s effect on the overall opioid overdose fatality 
rate because it makes it more difficult to pinpoint the exact drug that caused an overdose 
death (Tilley & Ingram, n.d.).  
Polydrug use also complicates the exact identification of the lethal drug in an 
overdose death. Polydrug use is common in overdose deaths in Jefferson County, 
Kentucky (Jefferson County Coroner’s Office, 2018). The Kentucky Medical Examiner’s 
Office (n.d.) reports all drugs identified in the individual’s body at the time of death on 
the toxicology report.  
Kentucky’s HB1 does not attempt to address heroin use or illicitly produced 
fentanyl use, only prescription drug misuse. An intended consequence of PDMP 
implementation is that the availability of prescription opioids for diversion to the illicit 
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market should decrease (White et al., 2016). The resulting lack of prescription opioid 
availability for misuse might encourage opioid misusers to make a choice to switch from 
prescription opioid abuse to heroin and illicitly produced fentanyl use.  
In 2016, during the first Opioid and Heroin Awareness Week, former United 
States Attorney General, Loretta Lynch, addressed the opioid epidemic with students at 
Madison Central High School in Richmond, Kentucky. Lynch repeatedly claimed during 
her visit that heroin addiction is usually preceded by a prescription drug problem. 
Specifically, Lynch stated that, “sometimes doctors and family members will recognize 
someone’s got a problem with pills and they’ll remove them, they’ll cut them off, and 
that is often when people will switch to heroin for the same effect” (WLKY News 
Louisville, 2016, 21:18).  
Muhuri, Gfroerer, and Davis (2013) provided evidence to support the possibility 
of a drug policy creating unintended consequences when they found that there was a 
strong relationship between first time heroin users and those who have misused 
prescription painkillers. Alpert, Powell, and Pacula (2017) provide another example of 
drug policy and unintended consequences in their study concerning the relationship 
between the reformulation of OxyContin, a prescription opioid, and heroin abuse. 
OxyContin abusers made the choice to switch to heroin and fentanyl when their opioid of 
choice, OxyContin, was reformulated making it more difficult to crush the drug for 





 The purpose of this quantitative research was to explore the possible relationship 
between the implementation of Kentucky’s PDMP and the subsequent rise in heroin and 
synthetic opioid overdose deaths as an unintended consequence of the implementation of 
the PDMP. The null hypothesis for this study was that there is no relationship between 
the implementation of Kentucky’s HB1 and the documented increase in heroin and 
synthetic opioid overdose rates in Jefferson County, Kentucky. The alternative hypothesis 
was that there is a relationship between the passage of Kentucky’s HB1 and the 
documented increase in heroin and synthetic opioid overdose rates in Jefferson County, 
Kentucky. Through this study, I examined variables related to the supply and demand of 
prescription opioids and heroin and synthetic opioids and compared these variables along 
with the prescription opioid, heroin, and synthetic opioid overdose rates between the 
years of 2007 and 2017. Current literature shows that PDMPs can be successful for 
changing physician prescribing habits and for reducing prescription drug overdose 
incidents (Finklea, Bagalman, & Sacco, 2014). Little is known, however, about the 
possible unintended consequences of implementing PDMPs.  
Alpert et al. (2017) researched the effects of the reformulation of OxyContin on 
the use of heroin. The researchers found that the reformulation created the unintended 
consequence of driving OxyContin misusers to switch to heroin use (Alpert et al., 2017).  
In this study, I explored the possible relationship between Kentucky’s PDMP and 
heroin and fentanyl overdose fatality rates to determine if Kentucky’s PDMP has had the 
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unintended consequence of driving prescription opioid misusers to switch to heroin and 
fentanyl use.  
A quantitative approach helped to identify and quantify possible relationships 
between the implementation of Kentucky’s PDMP and the increase in heroin and fentanyl 
overdose fatality rates in Jefferson County, Kentucky. Time series analyses were 
conducted using the implementation of Kentucky’s PDMP in 2012 as the independent 
variable. Prescription drug overdose fatality rates, heroin and synthetic opioid overdose 
fatality rates, and opioid prescribing rates over the identified time period were used as 
dependent variables to explore possible relationships from within a rational choice 
theoretical framework. 
Significance 
 This study fills a gap in the literature concerning the nature of heroin and 
synthetic opioid use in the presence of Kentucky’s PDMP, a policy that was intended to 
address prescription drug misuse. This study has the potential to reveal a deadly 
unintended consequence of a well-intentioned prescription drug regulation policy. This 
study is unique because there is very little current research that attempts to identify and 
quantify unintended consequences of PDMPs. Current research related to this study 
concerns the effectiveness of PDMPs and the choice variables related to making the 
switch from prescription opioids to heroin. There is an abundant amount of literature 
explaining these topics as well as the history of prescription opioid and heroin use. There 




The current state of heroin and fentanyl overdose fatalities in Jefferson County, 
Kentucky calls for a better understanding of what sparked and has driven the epidemic. 
The knowledge gained from this study could prove to be valuable for future policymakers 
concerned with authoring drug-related policy. The possibility of gaining knowledge in 
the area of unintended consequences of drug policy suggests serious positive social 
change implications. This knowledge could influence future drug policy considerations 
and ultimately save lives. 
Rational Choice Theory 
Rational choice theory was used as the theoretical framework for the current 
study. Rational choice theory posits that humans are rational beings (Beccaria, 1764; 
Cornish & Clarke, 1986). Because humans are rational beings, we make rational choices 
after weighing the perceived benefits against the perceived consequences of our choices. 
The beginnings of rational choice theory can be found in the writing of Cesare 
Beccaria (Wright, n.d.). Beccaria wrote concerning the condition of 18th century law and 
punishment. According Beccaria (1764), the natural state of man is self-serving and 
individualistic. The creation of society caused a need for individuals to give up a degree 
of freedom and conform to the will of the society. The surrender of some freedoms is 
necessary to gain the benefits of living in a civilized and non-chaotic society. This social 
contract creates an environment in which people must weigh the benefits, the natural 
desires of individuals, against the consequences, or deterrent factors, of acting contrary to 
the laws of society (Beccaria, 1764). Beccaria (1764) further believed that for laws to be 
truly deterrent, punishments for violation of the laws should be swift and certain. 
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Swiftness and certainty of punishment establishes a stronger psychological link between 
the illegal action and the punishment. The psychological link enhances the desired 
deterrent effects of punishment (Beccaria, 1764). 
Various academic works have included and expanded Beccaria’s ideas. For 
example, Jeremy Bentham, who was also concerned with controlling human behavior by 
using effective laws and punishment. Bentham also opined that humans are motivated by 
the receipt of pleasure and the avoidance of pain (Wright, n.d.). For the purpose of this 
study, the pleasure and pain discussed by Bentham are equivalent to the benefits and 
consequences of criminal behavior, as discussed by Cornish and Clarke (1986). 
From within the framework of rational choice theory, those who perceive that the 
benefits of committing a crime outweigh the perceived consequences for committing the 
same crime will make the rational choice to commit the act. The opposite is true when the 
consequences of committing the crime are perceived to outweigh the benefits of 
committing the same crime. When the perceived consequences outweigh the perceived 
benefits, crime is avoided (Beccaria, 1764; Cornish & Clarke, 1986). 
This study was informed by rational choice theory to examine the possibility that 
Kentucky’s PDMP played a part in the dramatic documented increase in the heroin and 
fentanyl overdose fatality rates in Jefferson County, Kentucky. If Kentuckians made a 
rational choice to switch from prescription opioid abuse to heroin and synthetic opioids, 
this choice would also be consistent with Skinner’s (1938) operant conditioning theory.  
Skinner (1938) explained that behavior can be encouraged through reinforcement 
or discouraged through punishment. The decision to switch from prescription opioid 
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abuse to heroin and fentanyl use is consistent with both positive and negative 
reinforcement The decision to switch to heroin and fentanyl abuse not only constitutes 
positive reinforcement due to the desired intoxicating rewards of continuing opioid abuse, 
but also negative reinforcement because the decision actively avoids the negative 
stimulus of enduring opioid withdrawal symptoms. From within a rational choice 
framework, both of the reinforcement stimuli mentioned would be considered benefits of 
choosing to switch to heroin and fentanyl abuse. 
Research Questions 
1. Did the implementation of Kentucky’s HB1 change the rate of heroin and fentanyl 
overdose fatalities in Jefferson County, Kentucky? 
a. Have opioid prescribing rates decreased after the implementation of 
Kentucky’s HB1? 
b. Have arrest rates for possession of heroin and synthetic opioids increased 
after the implementation of Kentucky’s HB1? 
c. Have arrest rates for trafficking of heroin and synthetic opioids increased 
after the implementation of Kentucky’s HB1? 
d. Is there a statistically significant difference in the opioid prescribing rate 
after the implementation of HB1? 
e. Is there a statistically significant difference in the prescription opioid 
overdose fatality rate after the implementation of HB1? 
f. Is there a statistically significant difference in the heroin and synthetic 
opioid overdose fatality rate after the implementation of HB1? 
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g. Is there a statistically significant relationship between prescribing rates 
and heroin and synthetic opioid overdose fatality rates? 
Nature of the Study 
The nature of this study was quantitative. Quantitative research is consistent with 
understanding relationships between variables. The variables in this research were those 
that coincide with the assumptions of rational choice theory. When faced with a choice of 
action, rational beings will weigh the benefits against the consequences of their actions 
(Cornish & Clarke, 1986). The intoxicating effects are desirable to opioid abusers and 
that withdrawal symptoms can be severe (U.S. National Library of Medicine, n.d.; 
Volkow, 2014).  
After the implementation of Kentucky’s PDMP, prescription drug abusers were 
possibly faced with the choice to discontinue opioid abuse and suffer opioid withdrawal 
symptoms, enter into drug rehabilitation treatment, or change to heroin and fentanyl use 
to continue receiving the intoxicating effects of opioids while simultaneously avoiding 
severe withdrawal symptoms. A rational choice in this position might be to change from 
prescription opioid abuse to heroin and fentanyl use.  
Prescribing rates and overdose fatality rates for prescription drugs and heroin and 
fentanyl prior to the passage of HB1 provided a baseline for this study. The 
implementation of Kentucky’s PDMP, in 2012, was used as the point in time when 
prescription opioid misusers might have been encouraged to make the switch to heroin 
and fentanyl abuse.  
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Changes in the drugs that have been identified in overdose toxicology reports 
after the passage of Kentucky’s PDMP indicate a need for identifying and quantifying the 
possible interactions and relationships over time between the implementation of 
Kentucky’s PDMP and prescription opioid, heroin, and fentanyl overdose fatality rates. 
There are limitations when using public arrest records. First, one must consider 
the possibility of human error. The truthfulness of the data output relies on many officers 
inputting arrest data correctly. This accuracy limitation leads to another limitation when 
using public arrest data. There are various types of opioids, and other drugs, for which a 
person might be arrested. The Louisville Metro Police Department arrest record database 
includes arrests for both possession and trafficking in a controlled substance with no drug 
identified. Although these entries are sure to include opioid-related violations, the data 
cannot be used in this study due to the lack of opioid identification. 
Changes in prescribing rates in Jefferson County, Kentucky also help to explain 
possible changes in the availability of prescription opioids for diversion in Louisville, 
Kentucky. A time series examination of the opioid prescribing rates and overall opioid 
overdose fatality rates in Louisville, Kentucky was conducted to evaluate the possible 
existence and strengths of relationships between the passage of HB1, the availability of 
prescription opioids for diversion, changes in overall drug overdose fatality rates, and 




Possible Types and Sources of Data 
1. Opioid prescribing rates obtained from the CDC’s (2018) U.S. Prescribing Rate 
Maps. 
2. Annual opioid overdose fatality reports from the CDC Wonder database. 
3. Arrest data obtained from the Louisville Metro Police Department’s online arrest 
database. 
Importance of This Study 
 The importance of this study is found in the positive social change implications. 
Understanding the possible negative consequences of drug policy implementation may 
help future policymakers to consider these consequences prior to policy implementation. 
The prediction of negative unintended consequences could lead to additional funding, for 
example, for the inclusion of drug treatment and public education initiatives and 
ultimately save many lives.  
Summary 
Jefferson County, Kentucky has a problem with opioid overdose fatalities. In 
2012, Kentucky passed HB1 to address the prescription opioid overdose problem. HB1, 
however, did not address opioids such as heroin and synthetic opioids like fentanyl and 
other illicitly manufactured opioids. After the passage of HB1, the occurrence of heroin 
and synthetic opioid overdose fatalities increased dramatically.  
This study was conducted to identify and quantify possible relationships between 
the passage of HB1 and the documented increase in heroin and synthetic opioid fatality 
rates. Supply and demand variables such as opioid-related arrest and prescription rates 
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were compared to the opioid-related overdose fatality rates during the time period 
between 2007 and 2017. The comparison of these variables helps to explain whether the 
implementation of HB1 helped to create an environment conducive to addicts switching 
from prescription opioid abuse to heroin and synthetic opioid use. 
Furthermore, this research helps to fill the literature gap concerning negative 
unintended consequences of PDMP implementation. This research is timely and needed 
because the opioid epidemic is widespread and states across the nation are struggling to 
create policies that will effectively address the epidemic. There is currently very little 
research concerning the unintended negative consequences of PDMP implementation. 
 To provide a better understanding of the history and current state of opioid use 
and abuse, I discuss in Chapter 2 the current literature pertaining to opioids in the United 
States, prescription opioid diversion, PDMP, unintended consequences of PDMP 
implementation, the gateway question, and motivation for switching from prescription 
opioid abuse to heroin use. Additionally, I address the social, economic, and political 




Chapter 2: Literature Review 
Introduction 
The Walden University Library was used to perform the majority of the literature 
review research for this study. Databases such as Ebsco and Proquest were accessed 
through the Criminal Justice Database on the Walden University Library website. Google 
scholar was also used to locate current literature. Most of the literature was located by 
researching references listed in the articles found in the databases. Information from 
various government websites is also cited. 
 Key search terms used were opioid, heroin, and PDMP related. Combinations of 
the key search terms and words such as history, unintended consequences, gateway, and 
others were also used. As mentioned, most of the literature research was done by locating 
and searching the references listed in articles found using the key search terms. 
 Most of the literature referenced in Chapter 2 was published within the current 
and past seven years, from 2012 through 2019. Some seminal or more aged literature was 
used to clarify topics such as the long-time utilized rational choice theory. Information 
from the resources is presented in Chapter 2. 
Jefferson County, Kentucky’s drug overdose fatality problem has undergone 
dramatic changes in recent years. The early driver of drug overdose deaths was 
prescription drug misuse. Now, the synthetic opioid fentanyl, alone or in conjunction 
with heroin, has overtaken prescription drugs as the most detected drugs identified in 
toxicology reports for overdose fatality victims (Office of the State Medical Examiner, 
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n.d.). The sudden and dramatic change followed the implementation of Kentucky’s 
PDMP in 2012.  
The intent of Kentucky’s PDMP was to decrease the rate of prescription drug 
misuse and overdose incidents. A successful PDMP would have the intended positive 
consequence of allowing fewer prescription drugs to be available for diversion to the 
illicit market (Kentucky General Assembly, 2012).  
Prescription opioids have been top contributors to the prescription drug overdose 
fatality problem prior to and after the implementation of Kentucky’s PDMP (Office of 
the State Medical Examiner, n.d.). Decreasing the availability of prescription opioids 
through PDMP regulation would have left the prescription opioid addict with a choice to 
make. Options could have included cessation of opioid abuse and suffering opioid 
withdrawal symptoms, entering drug rehabilitation treatment, or switching to an available 
substitute for the addict’s drug of choice. 
For the prescription opioid addict, any of the choices could be considered rational. 
In this research, I examined the possible existence and strengths of relationships between 
the implementation of Kentucky’s PDMP and prescription opioid, heroin, and synthetic 
opioid overdose rates before and after the implementation of Kentucky’s PDMP using a 
rational choice framework. I explored the possible relationships to obtain a better 
understanding of the changes that have been documented concerning prescription opioid 
overdose fatality rates and the possible substitution choice of heroin and synthetic opioid 
use and, ultimately, the dramatic documented rise in heroin and synthetic opioid overdose 
fatality rates.  
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PDMPs are designed to decrease the availability of prescription drugs for 
diversion and misuse (Kentucky General Assembly, 2012). Availability, or the lack 
thereof, is one of the primary reasons that prescription opioid users make the switch to 
heroin (Alpert et al.,2017; Beletsky, 2018; Fink et al., 2018; Li et al., 2014; Nam, Shea, 
Shi, & Moran, 2017). Prescription opioid addicts make the switch to heroin to avoid 
withdrawal symptoms when prescription opioids are not available (Alpert et al., 2017; 
Cicero, Ellis, Surratt, & Kurtz, 2014; Mars et al., 2014).  
It is logical to suppose that Kentucky’s PDMP implementation had the 
consequence of forcing prescription opioid addicts to weigh their options and make a 
choice about which path to follow in the absence of available prescription opioids. It is 
also logical to suppose that many prescription opioid addicts would choose to make the 
switch to heroin and synthetic opioids to avoid withdrawal symptoms and continue 
receiving the desired intoxicating effects of opioid misuse. Finally, following this 
reasoning, I explored the possibility that the implementation of Kentucky’s PDMP had 
the chilling unintended consequence of driving prescription opioid addicts to heroin and 
synthetic opioid use thereby dramatically increasing the heroin, synthetic opioid, and 
overall opioid fatality rates. 
In the following sections, I discuss the current literature concerning several 
related topics. First, I discuss a brief history of opioids and the timeline of events that 
created the current opioid epidemic. I then discuss the diversion of prescription drugs as a 
driver of the opioid problem that led to the development of PDMP across the nation and 
specifically in Kentucky. I examine the gateway question and withdrawal avoidance as 
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they are related to the implementation of Kentucky’s PDMP and the choice to switch 
from prescription opioid misuse to heroin and synthetic opioid use. I also discuss the 
social, economic, and political implications of the opioid overdose epidemic. Finally, I 
describe rational choice theory and how it might help to analyze the recent shift from 
prescription opioid abuse to heroin and fentanyl use.  
Framework  
Rational choice theory explains criminal behavior by considering the justification 
used in a decision whether or not to commit a crime. Rational choice theory assumes that 
humans are rational beings and that we make the most rational behavioral choices after 
weighing the benefits against the consequences of a specific behavior. If the benefits of 
an action outweigh the consequences, the rational choice would be to proceed with that 
action. If the consequences outweigh the benefits a specific behavior, the rational choice 
would be to refrain from the behavior (Beccaria, 1764; Cornish & Clarke, 1986). 
Rational choice theory has been applied in studies of drug use. In fact, Cornish 
and Clarke (1986) used a study of opioid misuse to help explain the theory. The study 
used in Cornish and Clarke’s (1986) book, “The Reasoning Criminal: Rational Choice 
Perspectives on Offending,” concerned initiation into opioid misuse. It is clearly 
established by the authors of rational choice theory that the theory is an appropriate 
theoretical framework for studying the rationale for drug initiation, continuance, and 
cessation.  
Although the choice to switch from prescription opioids to heroin and illicitly 
manufactured synthetic opioids is not a choice of whether to commit a crime but rather a 
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choice between two similar crimes, rational choice theory is an appropriate theoretical 
framework for this study. For the choice in question, rational actors would still weight the 
benefits against the consequences of changing behavior and decide. 
From within the rational choice theoretical framework, benefits of switching from 
prescription opioid use to heroin and fentanyl might be the avoidance of withdrawal 
symptoms, continuing to achieve the state of intoxication gained through prescription 
opioid abuse, or even avoiding the social stigma associated with participation in a drug 
rehabilitation program. These benefits might be weighed against negative consequences 
like, arrest, overdose, and death. While it seems unlikely that a rational person would 
choose to initiate heroin and synthetic opioid use with such extreme negative 
consequences, it is only necessary for the addict to weigh the near certain benefits against 
his or her perception of the probability of the negative consequences occurring. If the 
addict does not consider the probability of arrest, overdose, or death to be high enough, 
he might consider it a rational choice to proceed with the dangerous activity of heroin and 
fentanyl use. 
A Brief History of Opioids 
Opioids are a broad assortment of drugs that are derived from, or mimic the 
effects of, the chemicals naturally found in the opium poppy plant (NIDA, 2018). Opioids 
are primarily used in the medical field to manage pain, but they are also used for other 
issues like coughing and diarrhea (NIDA, 2018).  
In addition to the medical qualities of opioids, they can produce an intoxicated 
feeling that can encourage misuse (NIDA, 2018.). People who misuse opioids can obtain 
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them through various sources. Prescription opioids can be obtained for misuse through 
the diversion of legally prescribed medications to the illicit market. Heroin and synthetic 
opioids can be illicitly manufactured in clandestine labs and obtained through personal-
level drug transactions. In fact, the overwhelming majority of fentanyl overdose deaths 
are attributed to fentanyl made illicitly rather than regulated but diverted prescription 
fentanyl (Drug Enforcement Administration [DEA], 2017). 
Due to the diverse variety of drugs that are included under the broad canopy of 
opioids, they appear in all five schedules of the DEA’s schedule of controlled substances. 
Prescription opioids are listed in DEA schedules II through V depending upon their 
acceptance for legitimate medical use and propensity for addiction (DEA, n.d.).  
Fentanyl is a synthetic opioid that has an accepted medical use, but it can also be 
manufactured in unregulated clandestine laboratories and sold in the illicit market to 
effectively circumvent regulation (DEA, 2017, n.d.). Regulated fentanyl, used for 
legitimate medical purposes, is a schedule II-controlled substance due to its accepted 
medical purpose and high propensity for addiction (DEA, n.d.). Fentanyl is more potent 
than other prescription opioids, heroin, morphine and other synthetic opioids (DEA, 
2017; Rothberg & Stith, 2018).  
Heroin, a drug for which there is no accepted medical application, is a Schedule I 
controlled substance (DEA, n.d.). Both medical use and non-medical misuse of opioids 
can cause dependence and addiction (NIDA, n.d.). Addiction and misuse of opioids can 
cause unintentional overdose fatalities (NIDA, n.d.). A discussion of the current state of 
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the opioid epidemic should begin with a clear understanding of the history of opioids and 
opioid addiction in the United States. 
Opioid Use in the United States 
The general use of opium predates the independence of the United States by 
millennia. Research has identified the mention of opium and its intoxicating effects in 
ancient writings as far back as 1550 B.C. (Wright, 2011). Opioids have made their way 
into the United States through various routes.  
Opium and its derivatives have had a pronounced impact on the practice of 
medicine throughout American history. From the use of laudanum as a physician’s staple 
medication in the 1800s to the current state of opioid overdose fatalities of epidemic 
proportion, opioids have occupied a considerable portion of American medical and 
addiction history (Aronson, 2011; Tricky, 2018).  
Laudanum was created by Paracelsus in the late 1400s to mid-1500s by mixing 
opium and alcohol (Aronson, 2011). Laudanum was a staple medication used by 
American physicians in the late 1800s (Aronson, 2011). The mixture was used for 
various ailments ranging from sleeping aids for restless infants to pain management 
(Aronson, 2011; Trickey, 2018).  
A widely accepted explanation for 19th century opioid addiction began with a 
combination of the isolation of morphine from opium in 1804 and the perfection of the 
hypodermic syringe in the mid-1860s (Aronson, 2011: Trickey, 2018). In 1804, a German 
scientist named Friedrich Serturner isolated morphine from opium and created a water 
soluble, and therefore injectable, form of rapid-acting pain relief (Aronson 2011). More 
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importantly, however, for discussions involving historical drug policy is morphine’s use 
for various female medical issues (Trickey, 2018). Popular use of morphine in the late 
1800s for problems like menstrual cramps and nervous diseases made middle to upper-
class White women the leading demographic for opioid addiction where they represented 
60% of opioid addicts (Trickey, 2018).  
The United States Civil War during the early to mid-1860s has also been credited 
with 19th century morphine addiction (Lewy, 2013; Trickey, 2018). Lewy (2013), 
explains that the hypodermic syringe gained popularity throughout the Civil War. Civil 
War field physicians more commonly used powdered morphine applied directly to open 
wounds while physicians practicing away from the battlefield freely administered opium 
for pain relief (Lewy, 2013). The two observations by Lewy (2013) contradict the 
popular belief that the syringe played an important role in Civil War era opioid addiction. 
In fact, Guevremont, Barnes, and Haupt (2018) and Lewy (2013) argued that what we 
call addiction today, was referred to as a simple moral weakness, or bad habit, in the 
Civil War era and shortly thereafter. Therefore, Lewy (2013) rejected the popular idea 
that the phrase “army disease,” documented during and after the Civil War, referred to 
morphine addiction caused by exposure to morphine during the Civil War. 
There were no laws in the United States to regulate opioids prior to 1909, when 
the Pure Food and Drug Act required only that narcotic contents be listed on patent 
medicines (Aronson, 2011). Only two years later, the first International Opium 
Commission concluded that opium was a known “evil” but failed to enact legislation to 
regulate its use (Aronson, 2011).  
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The lack of opium regulation changed in the early 1900s with the arrival of 
Chinese immigrants. Chinese immigrants brought the practice of opium smoking and the 
social tradition of smoking opium in an opium den with them to the United States 
(Trickey, 2018). Opium dens in the United States were frequented by Chinese workers 
and lower-class White males (Trickey, 2018). Trickey (2018) argues that it is this change 
in demographics that led to subsequent regulation of opium in the United States. 
According to Trickey (2018) it was much easier politically to push legislation against 
Chinese and lower-class White male opium addicts than it was previously, when the 
primary opioid addict demographics included mainly upper-class White women and men 
returning home from the Civil War. In 1909, a bill was passed that made the importation 
of opium prepared for smoking a crime with a penalty of up to two years in prison 
(Trickey, 2018).  
The Harrison Act of 1914 was the first legislation to restrict the use of opium, and 
other narcotics, to medical use only (Aronson, 2011). Much later, during the Reagan era 
War on Drugs, harsh sentencing for drug offenders accompanied what appeared to be a 
return to class and race-related politics (Trickey, 2018). Trickey (2018) discovered that 
today’s opioid addicts are primarily White males and elderly people suffering from 
chronic pain from across the spectrum of social class. The tendency to identify the 
current opioid epidemic as a medical problem rather than a criminal problem is 
reminiscent of earlier days in America when opium use became a criminal issue only 
after Chinese immigrants and lower-class individuals became addicted (Trickey, 2018). 
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Considering the negative historical experiences with opioids and early legislation 
to regulate opium and opioids, it is difficult to imagine that modern physicians could be 
misled regarding the negative consequences of opioid use. However, HHS (n.d.a) 
explained that in the late 1990s, pharmaceutical companies misled physicians to believe 
that opioid pain relievers were not addictive. A simple historical review could have 
directed physicians to see beyond the misleading sales pitches of pharmaceutical 
companies and predict the oncoming wave of prescription opioid addicts. However, 
misguidance by the pharmaceutical companies led to a large increase in prescription rates 
for opioids across the United States (HHS, n.d.a).  
Many new generation prescription opioid addicts began with a steady supply of 
prescription medication. The primary method identified for obtaining prescription opioids 
was the diversion of prescription opioids from friends, family, and drug dealers in the 
illicit market (White et al., 2016). Poor prescribing habits and the diversion of opioids to 
the illicit market have helped to fuel a national prescription opioid crisis that has proven 
deadly for numerous Americans (HHS, n.d.a). 
Prescription Opioid Diversion 
The diversion of prescription opioids was a major driver of the opioid overdose 
fatality crisis (HHS, n.d.b; McCabe, West, & Boyd, 2013; Pit et al., 2018). For the 
purpose of this study, opioid diversion occurs when prescription opioids are misused 
either by someone other than the legally prescribed user or by someone who has a legal 
prescription but uses the opioids in a manner inconsistent with the prescription. 
Inconsistent uses include actions such as taking a higher than prescribed dosage and 
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taking leftover prescription opioids for purposes other than the reason for which the 
opioids were prescribed. Researchers have indicated various methods for obtaining 
diverted prescription drugs (Gau & Brooke, 2017; White et al., 2016).  
Studies have shown that the primary sources for obtaining diverted prescription 
opioids are family members and friends (Gau & Brooke, 2017; White et al., 2016). 
Doctors and other health care providers are also recognized sources for obtaining 
prescription drugs (McCabe et al., 2013; White et al., 2016). Improper prescribing 
practices by doctors and other health care providers has contributed to the availability of 
prescription opioids that could be diverted to illicit use (Dubois et al. 2016; HHS, n.d.b). 
A recent review of the existing literature confirmed that emergency departments were 
significant contributors to the diversion and misuse of prescription opioids (Lyapustina et 
al., 2017). A recent study of high school seniors revealed that of the 13% of high school 
seniors reporting prescription opioid misuse, the majority, 45%, obtained them from an 
emergency room physician (McCabe et al., 2013). Other physicians and dentists also 
contributed to the obtainment and misuse of prescription opioids by 38.3% and 27.1% 
respectively (McCabe et al, 2013).  
Pharmaceutical companies misled physicians in the late 1990s to believe that 
opioid pain relievers were not addictive (HHS, n.d.b). This information alone makes it 
appear that pharmaceutical companies were the main culprits in the prescription opioid 
crisis. However, Dubois et al. (2016) identified various recurring individual 
characteristics among physicians who had been investigated for improper prescribing 
practices. Furthermore, HHS (n.d.b) reported that the majority of opioid prescriptions 
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have been written by a small number of doctors. Doctor shopping, visiting multiple 
doctors to obtain multiple prescriptions, is another method of acquisition used by 
prescription opioid misusers (White et al., 2016; Van Hout, 2014). 
Harocopos and Bennett (2015) identified three distinct initiation routes into the 
misuse of opioids. All three initiation routes rely on the diversion of prescription opioids 
in order to sustain a prescription opioid addiction. First, heroin was a popular drug among 
specific subcultures throughout the 1960s and 1970s. Today’s older opioid misusers 
tended to have been holdovers from the that era (Harocopos & Bennett, 2015). This first 
group began opioid use with heroin but, in the modern era, they shifted to misusing 
prescription opioids that were diverted to the illicit market (Harocopos & Bennett, 2015). 
Recent initiates were more likely to have begun prescription opioid misuse from the other 
two routes, recreational or medical initiation (Harocopos & Bennett, 2015). Regardless of 
the initiation route, diversion has clearly played an important role in the current epidemic 
of prescription opioid misuse and overdose fatalities (White et al. 2016). 
PDMP 
 Poor prescribing practices, diversion, and abuse of prescription drugs can lead to 
addiction, overdose, and, in many cases, death. Prescription drug overdose fatality rates 
in the last decade have exposed a need for tighter regulation of prescription drugs. 
Prescription drug overdose and fatality rates in the United States have led to the 
implementation of PDMPs across the nation. PDMP regulations are implemented at the 
state level and they vary by state. 
28 
 
PDMPs are implemented to address prescription drug misuse in general by 
monitoring prescribing and dispensing practices concerning controlled substances. 
Theoretically, PDMPs decrease the frequency of poor prescribing habits and the 
diversion of prescription drugs to the illicit market (Gau & Brooke, 2017; Kentucky 
General Assembly, 2012). PDMPs attempt to control diversion methods such as doctor 
shopping and prescription fraud by directing physicians and pharmacists to access 
individual patient records regarding the prescribing and dispensing of prescription drugs 
(Kentucky General Assembly, 2012).  
Prescription opioid overdose fatality rates have been a primary concern in the 
implementation of PDMPs. The Kentucky General Assembly (2012) addressed 
Kentucky’s prescription opioid overdose problem through the passage of Kentucky’s 
HB1. HB1 targeted pain management facilities and provided funding for the upgrade and 
operation of the Kentucky All Schedule Prescription Electronic Reporting (KASPER) 
system, Kentucky’s prescription monitoring database and the heart of Kentucky’s PDMP 
(Kentucky General Assembly, 2012). 
 The CDC (2017, para. 3) states that PDMPs are “among the most promising state-
level interventions” for addressing the prescription drug abuse problem. Early literature 
on the topic confirms the CDC’s (2017) statement to an extent. Early literature shows that 
PDMPs can be successful for changing physician prescribing habits and for reducing 
prescription drug overdose incidents (Finklea et al., 2014).  
Current literature, however, suggests that PDMPS are not living up to the 
“promising” label given to PDMPs by the CDC (Compton, Jones, & Baldwin, 2016; 
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Hsien-Chang, Wang, Boyd, Simoni-Wastila, & Buu, 2018; Li, G. et al., 2014; Nam et 
al., 2017). Compton et al. (2016) claim only some success for states implementing 
thorough initiatives, including PDMPs, to decrease prescription opioid overdose 
fatalities. Hsien-Chang et al. (2018) studied prescribing habits and concluded that 
PDMPs have not been found to be effective for changing opioid prescribing habits for 
non-cancer chronic pain sufferers. Li et al. (2018) found that between the years of 1999 
through 2008 overdose fatality rates increased and that fatality rates were actually higher 
in states with PDMPs compered to states without PDMPs. Nam et al. (2017) found no 
statistical evidence that the existence of a PDMP reduces opioid overdose fatality rates. 
One recent study found the disabled and older Medicare recipients to be among 
the population achieving limited success in reducing opioid use (Moyo et al., 2017). 
Another study was inconclusive but provided evidence of unintended consequences of 
PDMP implementation, a primary consideration of the current study (Fink et al., 2018). 
Unintended Consequences of PDMP 
Two potential unintended consequences of PDMP that have been mentioned in 
current literature are the concern over limited access to legitimate prescription drugs for 
pain management and the movement of illicit prescription drug activities to neighboring 
states (Pit, Humphreys & Brandeau, 2018; Finklea et al., 2014; NIDA, n.d.). Muhuri et al. 
(2013) strengthened the argument that drug policy could create unintended consequences 
when they found that there was a strong relationship between first time heroin users and 
those who have misused prescription painkillers. This relationship adds another angle to 
the argument that prescription opioid misusers are willing to substitute heroin and 
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synthetic opioids for more expensive and less available prescription opioids. The switch 
from prescription opioids to heroin and synthetic opioids might be an unintended 
consequence of the implementation of a PDMP that successfully removes divertible 
prescription opioids from the illicit market (Compton et al., 2016; Pitt, Humphreys, & 
Brandeau, 2018). In fact, in many current studies, the authors elude to the possibility that 
PDMPs create the undesirable and unintended consequence of encouraging the move to 
cheaper heroin and fentanyl when prescription opioids are unavailable due to the 
implementation of a PDMP (Compton et al., 2016; Beletsky, 2018; Fink et al., 2018; Li et 
al., 2014; Nam et al., 2017; Pitt et al., 2018).  
Alpert et al. (2017) provide another example of drug policy and unintended 
consequences in their study concerning the relationship between the reformulation of 
OxyContin, a prescription opioid, and heroin abuse. OxyContin abusers made the choice 
to switch to heroin and fentanyl when OxyContin was reformulated making it more 
difficult to crush for inhalation or injection, the preferred method of use for OxyContin 
abusers (Alpert et al., 2017). Recent initiates to heroin use in the qualitative Alpert et al. 
(2017) study complained that the earlier form of OxyContin had become increasingly 
difficult to find causing many to substitute heroin use for their prescription opioid of 
choice, OxyContin.  
The Gateway Question: Does Prescription Opioid Addiction Lead to Heroin Use?  
Current literature indicates that the modern generation of heroin users is more 
likely than not to have initiated opioid misuse through the non-medical use of 
prescription opioids (Cicero et al., 2014; Unick et al., 2014). Studies have also shown that 
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most heroin users would have preferred to continue using prescription opioids, most 
specifically OxyContin, over making the switch to heroin use (Cicero et al., 2014; Mars 
et al., 2014; Unick et al., 2014). However, heroin and fentanyl are cheaper and more 
readily available than prescription opioids (Cicero et al., 2014; Rothberg & Stith, 2018). 
When the cost of prescription opioids was too great or there was a lack of prescription 
opioid availability, prescription opioid abusers have accepted heroin as a substitute drug 
(Alpert et al., 2017; Rothberg & Stith, 2018).  
Many current generation heroin misusers made the switch to heroin after having 
already become addicted to prescription opioids (Cicero et al., 2014; Mars et al., 2014). 
At least one study has added the level of purity and type of heroin available to the list of 
reasons why some people make the switch and others do not (Mars et al., 2014). The 
study was conducted in two cities. The cities were San Francisco, where low-purity black 
tar heroin was available but more expensive, and Philadelphia, where high-purity powder 
heroin was available at a lower cost (Mars et al., 2014). Although some San Francisco 
abusers made the switch, they were more likely to seek treatment rather than initiate 
heroin use (Mars et al., 2014). Those in Philadelphia with a high-purity, low cost heroin 
option, were more likely to make the switch from prescription opioid abuse to heroin use 
(Mars et al., 2014). Studies indicate that heroin cost, availability, and purity are all 
predictors for switching from prescription opioid abuse to heroin use (Alpert et al., 2017; 
Cicero et al., 2014; Mars et al., 2014).  
Addiction to prescription opioids generates a need for users to avoid withdrawal 
symptoms. The switch from prescription opioid abuse to heroin use has been regularly 
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linked to the higher cost and lower availability of prescription opioids and the purity and 
availability of heroin (Alpert et al., 2017; Cicero et al., 2014).  
Withdrawal Avoidance 
The main purpose of the current study was to identify and quantify any possible 
relationships with the implementation of Kentucky’s PDMP and a documented increase 
in heroin and synthetic opioid overdose fatalities. It is important, however, to note that 
Van Hout (2014) cited the use of codeine for withdrawal symptom avoidance. Codeine is 
considered a “weak” opioid but it is problematic because it is also addictive when 
misused and it can be purchased in low dosage without a prescription (Van Hout, 2014). 
The substitution of codeine for methadone or heroin for the management of withdrawals 
strengthens the idea that opioid addicts will misuse substitute opioids to avoid withdrawal 
symptoms (Alpert et al., 2017; Van Hout, 2014). The substitution of codeine for 
methadone or heroin is, admittedly, going in the opposite direction by substituting a 
weaker opioid for a stronger but unavailable prescription opioid. The focus of this study, 
in opposition, concerns the substitution of a stronger unregulated opioid, heroine or 
fentanyl, in the absence of prescription opioids.  
After having become addicted to prescription opioids, many addicts have found it 
difficult to either afford or locate enough prescription opioids to avoid withdrawal 
symptoms (Cicero et al., 2014; Mars et al., 2014). When offered the lower-cost and more 
readily available heroin substitute, many have chosen to make the switch to heroin use 




Fentanyl is a synthetic opioid. Synthetic opioids are manufactured in a laboratory 
without the use of the opium poppy plant (DEA, n.d.). The medical uses of fentanyl are 
typically for the treatment of severe and post-surgical pain (NIDA, 2016). The DEA (n.d., 
para. 4) reports that fentanyl is “50-100 times more potent than morphine and 30-50 
times more potent than heroin.” Due to the high potency, fentanyl can be deadly at 
relatively low doses (DEA, n.d.).  
In a 2008 study, Hall et al. reported that 50% of opioid overdose fatalities in West 
Virginia were the result of diverted prescription fentanyl. Prescription opioids are no 
longer the primary source for opioid overdose fatalities. Government agencies currently 
report that illicitly manufactured fentanyl is the primary source for the majority of 
fentanyl-related overdose fatalities (DEA, n.d.; NIDA, 2016).  
Illicitly manufactured fentanyl is sold in various forms including powder, spiked 
blotters, combined with heroin, as a substitute for heroin, or in the form of tablets that 
mimic less potent opioids (NIDA, 2016). Regardless of whether the primary source for 
fentanyl is diverted prescription fentanyl or illicitly manufactured fentanyl, fentanyl has 
become the most commonly identified drug in toxicology reports in Kentucky (Office of 
the State Medical Examiner, n.d.). 
Supply and Demand 
 PDMPs are meant to reduce the supply of prescription opioids available for 
misuse (CDC, 2017; Kentucky General Assembly, 2012). If a PDMP has been successful 
in reducing the illicit supply of prescription opioids, addicts were forced to make a 
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choice. One option for addicts is to substitute their opioid of choice for another form of 
opioid. 
The interplay of supply and demand variables could encourage prescription opioid 
misusers to make the switch to heroin and fentanyl use. Fewer prescription opioids, 
driving the price of diverted prescription opioids up, mixed with a steady supply of 
heroin and illicitly produced fentanyl, driving the heroin and fentanyl prices down, 
interact with the continuing demand for opioids to make switching to heroin and fentanyl 
appear to be the rational choice for prescription opioid misusers. 
Social Implications 
 Current literature discusses multiple social implications of the modern opioid 
overdose epidemic. Governments at the state and federal levels have attempted to address 
the opioid crisis through legislation. Government legislation has sparked a number of 
social concerns for researchers. 
Class, Race, and Public Opinion 
 Public opinion has been somewhat fluid concerning drug use and abuse. Social 
class and race appear to have played important roles in defining and addressing drug use 
problems. Opioids, in particular, have a long history of class and race-related policy and 
legislation. There was no criminalization of opioid use until opium dens, frequented by 
Chinese immigrant workers and lower-class Whites, replaced civil war veterans, middle 
to upper-class White women, and elderly citizens suffering from chronic pain as the 
primary users of opium (Trickey, 2018). 
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Trickey (2018) briefly mentioned the tough on drugs policies and harsh 
sentencing for predominantly Black and Hispanic drug offenders during the Reagan-era 
War on Drugs. McLean (2017) and Trickey (2018) contrasted the criminalization of drug 
use for previous generations of addicts with the relaxed view of addiction as a medical 
problem for today’s opioid addicts. Today’s opioid addicts are primarily White males and 
elderly people suffering from chronic pain. McLean (2017) argued that it has been much 
easier to gain political support for anti-drug legislation when the primary group having 
been targeted was from minority and lower social statuses. 
Pain Management 
A common concern in current literature has been the question of whether patients 
receive the most adequate treatment for pain as determined by their physician 
(Guevremont et al., 2018, Pit et al., 2018). Guevremont et al. (2018) argued that 
physicians are better situated than politicians to make treatment decisions based on their 
relationships with each individual patient. The researchers also acknowledged, however, 
that opioid treatment has the possibility of reaching beyond the intended patient through 
diversion thereby creating a broader social problem for which the government might be 
better situated to address (Guevremont et al., 2018). The concern for Guevremont et al. 
(2018) is that the limitations on physician autonomy for treating the individual patient on 
a case-by-case basis results in one size fits all legislative treatment rather than treatment 
by physicians, who are already monitored by state medical boards and who are better 
situated to make individual treatment decisions. 
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Opioid Maintenance Treatment 
 The primary use for opioids in a medical setting is the management of pain. In 
addition to pain management, certain opioids such as methadone and buprenorphine are 
used in opioid maintenance treatment for people who are already addicted to opioids 
(Guevremont et al., 2018). There is concern that a series of regulations by the federal 
government curtails adequate access to maintenance treatment for opioid addicted 
patients (Guevremont et al., 2018). Beginning with the Harrison Narcotics Act of 1914 
and continuing through the Controlled Substances Act of 1970 and the Drug Abuse 
Treatment Act of 2000, the United States government has placed limitations on opioid 
maintenance use as a treatment for opioid addiction (Guevremont et al., 2018). 
Diversion Through Poor Storage and Disposal Practices 
 Another social concern that has been thoroughly studied is the diversion of 
prescription opioids to the illicit market (Dubois et al., 2016; Fujii, et al., 2018; Gau & 
Brooke, 2017; White et al., 2016). Current studies indicate that excessive prescriptions 
and improper storage and disposal of unused prescription opioids contribute to the 
diversion of prescription opioids (Fujii et al., 2018; McDonald, et al., 2017). Fujii et al. 
(2018) found that patients have historically been prescribed excessive amounts of opioids 
after certain surgeries and that the number of opioids prescribed after surgery varied by 
physician. When patients obtain more opioids than needed to complete recovery, it can 
result in having leftover opioids that can be easily diverted to illicit use (Fujii et al., 
2018). Many patients with leftover prescription opioids fail to properly dispose of the 
excess medication (Fujii et al., 2018; McDonald et al., 2017). The failure to dispose of 
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excess opioids contributes to the addiction and overdose epidemic (McDonald et al., 
2017). Fujii et al. (2018) and McDonald et al. (2017) suggest that educating patients on 
the need for proper use, storage, and disposal of opioids could lead to improved outcomes 
for fighting the diversion of opioids to the illicit market. The findings of the McDonald et 
al. (2017) study are particularly troubling because their findings related particularly to 
households with children present. 
Involuntary Civil Commitment 
 Many states have enacted legislation that allows the involuntary civil commitment 
of addicts for treatment with very little, if any, due process (Bhalla, Cohen, Hupt, Stith, & 
Zhong, 2018). The legislation addresses opioid addiction as a medical condition rather 
than a criminal choice (Bhalla et al., 2018). Involuntary civil commitment is intended to 
separate the addict from illicit sources of opioids and some states provide addiction 
treatment while the addict is involuntarily committed (Bhalla et al., 2018). In essence, 
involuntary commitment is used to protect addicts from harming themselves by isolating 
them from society and providing treatment for their addiction (Bhalla et al., 2018). A 
major concern for Bhalla et al., (2018) is the lack of evidence that patients actually 
receive effective treatment while involuntarily committed. One reason that this is 
exceptionally concerning from a social standpoint is the implication that an addict’s 
tolerance to opioids decreases while committed and, when released from involuntary 
commitment, the addict is at a higher risk for opioid overdose (Bhalla et al., 2018). This 




Implications for Addicts Seeking Justice 
 Fresher (2018) discusses the plight of addicts who seek damages in courtrooms 
across the United States but are denied justice due to the “wrongful conduct rule.” The 
wrongful conduct rule refers to the notion by judges and juries that addicts are not 
entitled to damages because their addiction is, at least in part, due to their involvement in 
illegal activity (Fresher, 2018). Unfortunately, many opioid addicts have become 
addicted through no fault of their own without having made a single criminal choice 
(HHS, n.d.a). Poor prescribing habits fueled by false pharmaceutical company sales 
pitches concerning the addictive qualities of modern opioids has led to many patients 
having been improperly treated with opioids and having become addicted (HHS, n.d.a). 
In these instances, it hardly seems just for patients to be denied the opportunity to receive 
damages from those who contributed to their condition. The application of the wrongful 
conduct rule appears to be an unjust negative societal implication of the current state of 
opioid addiction. 
Economic Implications 
There is plenty of evidence in current literature to confidently state that the opioid 
crisis has resulted in an enormous economic burden in the United States. It is difficult to 
report an exact dollar amount of the financial burden created by the epidemic because 
various studies use different measures. Common measures have been large increases in 
medical care and treatment of opioid addicts (Hollingsworth, Ruhm, & Simon, 2017; 
Fudin, 2015; Litton, 2018) Other measures have included lost productivity, costs incurred 
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by insurance providers, costs incurred by Medicare and Medicaid, and foreign aid to 
curtail opioid production and trafficking.  
Overall, it has been estimated that the opioid epidemic has cost the United States 
more than one trillion dollars between the years 2001 and 2017 (Litton, 2018). In 2007 
alone, the costs were estimated at 55.7 billion dollars (Hollingsworthet al., 2017; Meyer, 
Patel, Rattana, Quock, & Mody, 2014). Litton (2018) referenced a report by the non-
profit organization, Altarum, that estimated an additional 500-billion-dollar burden to 
come between the years between 2017 and 2020. 
Litton (2018) reported that lost earnings and productivity due to overdose deaths 
are the largest contributors to the financial burden of the opioid epidemic. The cost of 
earnings and productivity loss were estimated at 800,000 dollars per opioid overdose 
victim (Litton, 2018). The estimate includes the loss of tax revenue as overdose victims 
are removed from the workforce (Litton, 2018). 
Healthcare costs were estimated by Litton (2018) to be 215.7 billion dollars 
between 2001 and 2017. Medicaid has covered much of the healthcare financial burden 
(Litton, 2018). Hollingsworth, et al. (2017) reported that Medicaid covers an average of 
5,874 to 15,183 dollars per year on opioid-related health care. Medicare was the primary 
payer for heroin overdose victims and Medicaid was the primary payer for prescription 
opioid overdose victims between 2001 and 2012 (Hsu, McCarthy & Stephens, 2017). 
During the time period between 2001 and 2012 prescription opioid overdose victims 
presented a larger financial burden, in part due to the fact that heroin overdose victims 
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were more likely to have left the healthcare facility against medical advice (Hsu et al., 
2017). 
Financial aid provided to the states by the federal government has also contributed 
to the financial burden as a result of the opioid overdose epidemic. In 2016, Congress 
passed the Century Cures Act and it was signed by President Obama to provide financial 
assistance to states for the purposes of primary and secondary prevention measures 
between 2016 and 2018 (Sarpatwari, Sinha & Kesselheim, 2017). 
In addition to state funding, the federal government also provides financial 
assistance to foreign countries to help combat the trafficking of opioids and other illicit 
drugs into the United States (Felter, 2017). According to Felter (2017), The United States 
has provided almost three-billion-dollars to Mexico, and an additional near ten-billion-
dollars to Colombia to combat the illicit drug trade that funnels opioids and other drugs 
into the United States. 
Political Implications 
The opioid overdose epidemic has certainly entered the realm of U.S. politics. 
Politicians and voters are using the issue to campaign and make political choices 
respectively (Gibson, 2018; Smith, 2018). Political candidates from both sides of the aisle 
are using the issue to gain political favor (Gibson, 2018). Both Republicans and 
Democrats seeking office have taken a stand in one way or another in the fight to reduce 
opioid abuse and overdose fatalities (Gibson, 2018). The primary difference between 
Republican and Democrat parties has been said to be the way in which each party sees 
the appropriate response to the epidemic (Gibson, 2018; McDonough, 2016; Smith, 
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2018). Republicans have sought a law enforcement approach while Democrats have 
sought a treatment-based approach (Gibson, 2018; McDonough, 2016; Smith, 2018).  
Just prior to the 2018 midterm elections, President Trump claimed a bipartisan 
victory after signing legislation that would address the opioid epidemic with an additional 
six-billion dollars to increase both law enforcement efforts, historically promoted by the 
right, and access to medical treatment for opioid addiction, historically promoted by the 
left (Jackson & Fritze, 2018). 
 Research has suggested that there are underutilized alternatives to opioids for 
effective pain management (Atkinson, Schatman, & Fudin, 2014; Dennenberg & Curtiss, 
2016; Lipman, 2015). Atkinson et al. (2014), Dennenberg and Curtiss (2016), and 
Lipman (2015) advocate the education of healthcare providers on the existence and 
effectiveness of the pain treatment alternatives. Atkinson et al. (2014) and Dennenberg 
and Curtiss (2016) discuss alternative treatments such as acupuncture and massage that 
are not typically covered by insurance companies. Lipman (2015) discusses the 
alternatives of psychology and physical therapy that are also not always covered by 
insurance providers. Lipman (2015) further points out the relationships between 
insurance companies and their lobbying and financial political support for politicians as 
an additional barrier to alternative treatment coverage. 
 In contrast to the messages surely conveyed through lobbying and financial 
support from insurance companies, Guy (2018) encourages Congress to mandate 
treatment coverage for opioid addiction. Guy (2018) explains that Congress has the 
authority to enact such legislation through the Necessary and Proper Clause and the 
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Taxing and Spending Clause of the Affordable Care Act (ACA). According to Guy 
(2018), the mandated coverage of opioid addiction treatment by insurance companies is a 
way to get to the root of the opioid misuse and overdose problem.  
 McCoy and Kanter (2018) researched the financial relationships between 
pharmaceutical firms that have been investigated for contributing to the opioid epidemic 
and congressional members of the political action committees primarily responsible for 
addressing the opioid epidemic. Not surprisingly, the researchers found substantial ties 
between committee members and campaign contributions from the firms being 
investigated by state and federal officials (McCoy & Kanter, 2018). Clearly, the 
campaign contributions create an obstacle for Congressional action that might affect the 
profitability of these firms. 
Gap in Literature 
 There is a substantial amount of literature dedicated to opioids and the current 
opioid overdose fatality epidemic. The body of knowledge is currently increasing at a 
rapid rate due to the urgency of the crisis. The available literature undoubtedly describes 
the history of opioid use, abuse, and addiction in the United States. Opioid misuse can 
lead to addiction and researchers have found that opioid addicts are willing to switch 
from prescription opioid misuse to heroin and synthetic opioid use for various reasons. 
Reasons include cost, availability, purity, and withdrawal symptom avoidance. Current 
literature has also thoroughly covered the broad topics of legislation intended to decrease 
opioid overdose fatalities and some of the unintended consequences of such legislation. 
Kentucky’s PDMP is one example of the types of legislation intended to decrease the 
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prescription opioid fatality rate. Kentucky’s PDMP was defined in HB1 in 2012. The 
heroin and fentanyl overdose fatality rates increased rapidly after the passage of HB1. 
The gap in the literature that was addressed in the current study relates to the 
identification and quantification of possible relationships between the implementation of 
Kentucky’s PDMP and the documented increase in heroin and fentanyl overdose fatality 
rates in Jefferson County, Kentucky. 
Summary 
Opioid use and abuse have long been a part of American existence (Aronson, 
2011; Tricky, 2018). Early uses were primarily medical, but some recreational use was 
reported in opium dens (Aronson, 2011; Trickey, 2018). Recent history shows a problem 
with abuse, overdose, and deaths related to prescription opioids. Much of the problem 
with prescription opioids is related to the diversion of prescription opioids to the illicit 
market (HHS, n.d.b; McCabe et al., 2013; Pit et al., 2018). PDMPs were implemented 
across the United States to monitor prescribing practices and address the problem of 
prescription drug diversion (Gau & Brooke, 2017; Kentucky General Assembly, 2012). 
Research has shown that prescription opioid abuse is a common precursor to heroin use 
(Cicero et al., 2014; Unick et al., 2014). One unintended consequence of PDMP that has 
been identified is that prescription opioid addicts will turn to heroin and illicitly 
manufactured synthetic opioids when the cost of prescription opioids becomes too high or 
when prescription opioids are no longer readily available (Mars et al., 2014). The switch 
from abusing prescription opioids to heroin and synthetic opioid use carries with it a 
multitude of social, economic, and political implications (Dubois et al., 2016; Fudin, 
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2015; Fujii et al., 2018; Gau & Brooke, 2017; Gibson, 2018; Guevremont et al., 2017; 
Litton, 2018; McDonald et al., 2017; McLean, 2017; Pit et al., 2018; Trickey, 2018; 
Meyer et al., 2014; Smith, 2018; White et al., 2016). 
I addressed the gap in the literature by researching the possible relationships 
between PDMP implementation in Kentucky with the documented increase in heroin and 
synthetic opioid overdose rates. Using the methodology described in Chapter 3 advanced 
the knowledge in this area and helped to fill the literature gap. 
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Chapter 3: Methodology 
Introduction 
Chapter 3 includes the methodology that was used to explore the possible 
relationships between the passage of HB1 and a documented increase in heroin and 
synthetic opioid overdose fatality rates. Discovering and quantifying the possible 
relationships was the purpose of this study. In this chapter, I address the research design 
and rationale as well as the data analysis, and validity of the study.  
In this quantitative study, I used a quasi-experimental research design to identify 
and quantify the possible relationships between the passage of Kentucky’s HB1 and a 
documented increase in heroin and synthetic opioid overdose fatalities in Jefferson 
County, Kentucky. 
Cost and availability of opioids play roles in the decision to switch from 
prescription opioid misuse to heroin use (Ciccarone, 2009; Unick et al., 2014). 
Kentucky’s HB1 was passed in 2012 with the intent of reducing the availability of 
prescription drugs for diversion to illicit use. This research focused on the availability of 
prescription opioids, heroin and synthetic opioids, to discover if the supply of both types 
of opioids created an environment conducive to encouraging prescription opioid misusers 
to choose to make the switch to heroin and synthetic opioid use. With the implementation 
of HB1, prescription opioid addicts might have been faced with the choice of stopping 
opioid misuse or switching to an available alternative. 
First, reviews of LMPD arrest records were conducted to see if the 
implementation of HB1 influenced supply and demand related variables. For the purpose 
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of this study, supply and demand variables were arrest rates for trafficking and possession 
of prescription opioids, heroin, and synthetic opioids. Next, an interrupted time series 
study was conducted to see if HB1 had the intended effect of reducing prescribing rates 
for opioids. Additionally, interrupted time series studies were conducted to see if HB1 
influenced death rates for prescription opioids, heroin, and synthetic opioids. Finally, an 
interrupted time series study was conducted to identify and quantify possible 
relationships between prescribing rates and opioid overdose death rates.  
Variables 
There were five primary objectives for this study. First, prescribing data were 
analyzed to reveal whether prescribing rates were reduced, as desired, by the intervention 
HB1. Second, opioid overdose fatality rates were analyzed to reveal whether the 
implementation of HB1 had an effect on opioid-related fatalities. Third, arrest data were 
analyzed to discover the supply and demand conditions for prescription and synthetic 
opioids in Jefferson County, Kentucky prior to and after the passage of Kentucky’s HB1. 
Fourth, prescribing rates and opioid overdose fatality rates were analyzed to identify 
possible relationships. Finally, prescribing rates and supply and demand variables were 
analyzed to identify and quantify possible relationships. 
Objective one was met using an interrupted time series study in which the 
independent variable was time. The year 2012, in which Kentucky’s HB1 was 
implemented, acted as the point in time that the intervention, HB1, was introduced. The 




Objective two was met using an interrupted time series study in which the 
independent variable was also time. 2012 again acted as the point in time that the 
intervention, HB1, was introduced. The dependent variable for objective two was 
prescription opioid overdose fatality rates, heroin overdose fatality rates, and synthetic 
opioid overdose fatality rates. 
Objective three was also met using an interrupted time series study. Again, time 
was the independent variable and 2012 was the point in time when the intervention, HB1, 
was introduced. Dependent variables were arrest rates for possession and trafficking of 
prescription opioids, arrest records for possession and trafficking of heroin, and 
possession and trafficking of synthetic opioids. 
Objective four was met using interrupted time series analyses. Opioid prescribing 
rates were used as the independent variable. The dependent variables for meeting 
objective four were prescription opioid overdose fatality rates, heroin overdose fatality 
rates, and synthetic opioid overdose fatality rates. 
Objective five was met using bivariate regression analyses. Opioid prescribing 
rates were the independent variable. The dependent variables for meeting objective five 
were arrest records for possession and trafficking of prescription opioids, possession and 
trafficking of heroin, and possession and trafficking of synthetic opioids. 
Research Design 
I used interrupted time series studies to identify possible effects of the 
implementation of Kentucky’s HB1. The years prior to 2012 established a baseline for 
comparison. The comparison clarified trends prior to and following 2012, the year that 
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Kentucky’s HB1 was passed into law. The interrupted time series analysis was used 
because it allowed for the isolation of the year 2012 as a point in time when the 
independent variable, HB1, was introduced to the population of Kentucky. I was 
interested in the possible changes among dependent variables related to the heroin and 
synthetic opioid crisis in Jefferson County, Kentucky. The dependent variables were 
related to opioid availability, prescription opioid overdose fatality rates, and heroin and 
synthetic opioid overdose fatality rates over the time period between 2007 and 2017. The 
10-year range includes the 5 years prior to and 5 years after the passage of HB1. The 10-
year period included sufficient time before and after the introduction of HB1 to identify 
any pre-HB1 trends to be compared with post-HB1 trends. Identification of trends helped 
to understand the possible relationships between the passage of HB1 and the recent 
documented increase in heroin and synthetic opioid overdose rates. 
Target Population 
Inclusion in this study was based on inclusion in various publicly available 
databases. Each database focuses on the geographical area of Jefferson County, 
Kentucky. 
The availability of both prescription opioids and heroin and synthetic opioids was 
measured using the Louisville Metro Police Department’s arrest records database. The 
database is available on the Louisville Metro Police Department public website. Arrest 
record data was helpful with understanding both the availability of and demand for illicit 
prescription opioids and heroin and other synthetic opioids.  
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The target population for primary objective one of this study, determining the 
supply and demand environment in Jefferson County, Kentucky before and after the 
passage of HB1, was drawn from the Louisville Metro Police Department web page, 
https://data.louisvilleky.gov/dataset/crime-reports. Each year was selected and filtered to 
reveal arrests for the following violations: 
• Importing Heroin 
• Possession of a Controlled Substance – 1st Degree - 1st Offense - Heroin 
• Possession of a Controlled Substance - 1st Degree – 2nd Offense - Heroin 
• Possession of a Controlled Substance – 1st Degree – 3rd or > Offense - Heroin 
• Possession of a Controlled Substance – 1st Degree – 1st Offense - Opiates 
• Possession of a Controlled Substance – 2nd Offense – Opiates 
• Possession of a Controlled Substance-1st Degree 3rd or > Offense – Opiates 
• Possession of a Controlled Substance – 2nd Degree - Codeine 
• Trafficking a Controlled Substance – 1st Degree – 1st Offense (< 10 DU Opiates) 
• Trafficking a Controlled Substance – (> or = 10 DU Opiates) 
• Trafficking a Controlled Substance – 1st Degree -1st Offense - Heroin (> or = 2 
Grams but < 100G) 
• Trafficking a Controlled Substance – 1st Degree – 1st Offense (< 2 Grams - 
Heroin)  




• Trafficking a Controlled Substance – 1st Degree – 2nd or > Offense (> or = 2 
Grams - Heroin) 
• Aggravated Trafficking in a Controlled Substance - 1st Degree (> or = 100 Grams 
- Heroin) 
• Trafficking a Controlled Substance – 1st Degree – 2nd or > Offense (< 10 DU 
Opiates) 
• Trafficking a Controlled Substance – 1st Degree – 2nd or > Offense (> or = 10 DU 
Opiates) 
• Trafficking a Controlled Substance – 2nd Degree-1st Offense (> or = 10 DU 
Codeine) 
• Trafficking a Controlled Substance – -2nd Degree – 1st Offense (< 10 DU 
Codeine) 
• Trafficking a Controlled Substance – 2nd Degree – 2nd or > Offense (> or = 10 DU 
Codeine) 
• Trafficking a Controlled Substance – 1st Degree – 1st offense (< 2 Grams 
Fentanyl) 
• Trafficking a Controlled Substance – 1st Degree – 2nd Offense or > (> Or = 2 
Grams - Fentanyl) 
• Trafficking a Controlled Substance –, 1st Degree – 2nd Offense or > (< 2 Grams 
Fentanyl) 
The target population for primary objective two of this study, determining and 
quantifying possible relationships between the passage of HB1 and a documented 
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increase in heroin and synthetic opioids, was people who have died in Jefferson County, 
Kentucky due to opioid-related overdose. The sample was drawn from CDC archives 
found at https://www.wonder.cdc.gov. The “Multiple Causes of death (Detailed 
Mortality)” link listed under the heading “Mortality” was clicked to open a page 
containing search by date options. The data request link in the “1999-2017” category was 
clicked, and the terms of use agreement page was activated.  
For section one, the group results were filtered by state and county. For section 
two, the state of Kentucky was highlighted, and the “open” button selected to reveal and 
select “21111 (Jefferson County, KY).” All categories remained selected in the 2013 
Urbanization selection box. For section three, all categories remained with the default 
selections of “All Ages,” “All Genders,” “All Origins,” and “All Races.” 
There were multiple entries for section four due to the fact that there were 
multiple years examined in this study. The individual years from 2007 through 2017 were 
input into section four to obtain a data set for each year.  
The section five boxes remained with their default selections of “All Weekdays,” 
“All Values,” and “All Places.” For section six, the “UCD – ICD-10 Codes” radio button 
and “*All* (All Causes of Death) remained selected.  
Section seven was changed several times to include the various categories of 
opioids as the cause of death. The values of T-40.0 (Opium), T-40.1 (Heroin), T-40.2 
(Other Opioids), T-40.3 (Methadone), T-40.4 (Other Synthetic Narcotics) were used 
individually in separate searches to obtain data for the various opioid-related causes of 
death for each year included in this study. 
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Data Analysis Plan 
SPSS was used to employ interrupted time series analyses. Prescribing rates for 
Jefferson County, Kentucky, as reported by the CDC’s (n.d.) U.S. Opioid Prescribing 
Rate Maps, were entered into SPSS along with prescription opioids death rates and heroin 
and synthetic opioid death rates. Interrupted time series analyses quantified possible 
relationships between the prescribing rates and opioid mortality rates. 
Opioid death statistics for Jefferson County Kentucky were further entered into 
SPSS to quantify possible effects of implementing Kentucky’s HB1. Data were collected 
from the online database published by CDC Wonder (Centers for Disease Control and 
Prevention, n.d.). The analyses measured the possible effects that the intervention, HB1, 
had on opioid prescribing rates as well as prescription opioid and heroin and synthetic 
opioid overdose fatality statistics. Opioid overdose fatality rates for the years between 
2007 and 2017 were entered to indicate changes in fatality rates after the passage of 
HB1and infer possible relationships between both variables. 
Threats to Validity 
 Although attempts were made to include all pertinent data into this study, it was 
unavoidable that some data were missing. This lack of data could pose a significant threat 
to the validity of objective one in this study. The dataset that was compiled for objective 
one of this study comes from published police arrest statistics. While this might be a valid 
way to collect data concerning the supply and demand for specific drugs, the database is 
lacking in some ways. First, the data only measure the number of people who were 
charged with one of the multiple crimes indicating a supply or demand for opioids. The 
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data set fails to recognize the multitude of people who are never arrested or charged with 
violating the statutes. Furthermore, some of the charges listed in the data set are vague. 
This vagueness makes it impossible to determine an exact number for each violation of 
law concerning opioids. For example, there are many people charged with Possession of 
a Controlled Substance. This leaves out the indication of which type of controlled 
substance that was allegedly possessed. Therefore, the statistics for these charges must be 
left out of the current study.  
Ethical Procedures 
 All data were collected from publicly accessible website databases. No personal 
identification of anyone included in the sample can be made using the data included in 
this study. The Louisville Metro Police Department webpage contains both the date of 
arrest and address of arrest. Date of arrest and address of arrest could arguably be used to 
narrow identification of arrested subjects, but this data will not be included in the current 
study. 
Summary 
 I explored the possible relationships between the passage of HB1 and recent 
documented increases in heroin and synthetic opioid overdose deaths.  
This research was guided by the following research questions: 
1. Did the implementation of Kentucky’s HB1 change the rate of heroin and fentanyl 
overdose fatalities in Jefferson County, Kentucky? 




b. Have arrest rates for possession of heroin and synthetic opioids increased 
after the implementation of Kentucky’s HB1? 
c. Have arrest rates for trafficking of heroin and synthetic opioids increased 
after the implementation of Kentucky’s HB1? 
d. Is there a statistically significant difference in the opioid prescribing rate 
after the implementation of HB1? 
e. Is there a statistically significant difference in the prescription opioid 
overdose fatality rate after the implementation of HB1? 
f. Is there a statistically significant difference in the heroin and synthetic 
opioid overdose fatality rate after the implementation of HB1? 
g. Is there a statistically significant relationship between prescribing rates 
and heroin and synthetic opioid overdose fatality rates? 
I used quantitative time series analyses methods to explore the possible relationships. 
All data were collected from publicly accessible website databases that do not contain 
personal identifiable information. The results of this study can be used to guide future 
drug legislation and avoid unintended consequences that may prove deadly for a large 
portion of the population. The positive social implication for this study is that the results 




Chapter 4: Application to Professional Practice and Implications for Social Change  
Introduction 
The purpose of this study was to identify and quantify the possible relationships 
between the passage of HB1 and a documented increase in heroin and synthetic opioid 
overdose fatalities. The research was guided by the following research questions: 
1. Did the implementation of Kentucky’s HB1 change the rate of heroin and fentanyl 
overdose fatalities in Jefferson County, Kentucky? 
a. Have opioid prescribing rates decreased after the implementation of 
Kentucky’s HB1? 
b. Have arrest rates for possession of heroin and synthetic opioids increased 
after the implementation of Kentucky’s HB1? 
c. Have arrest rates for trafficking of heroin and synthetic opioids increased 
after the implementation of Kentucky’s HB1? 
d. Is there a statistically significant difference in the opioid prescribing rate 
after the implementation of HB1? 
e. Is there a statistically significant difference in the prescription opioid 
overdose fatality rate after the implementation of HB1? 
f. Is there a statistically significant difference in the heroin and synthetic 
opioid overdose fatality rate after the implementation of HB1? 
g. Is there a statistically significant relationship between prescribing rates 
and heroin and synthetic opioid overdose fatality rates? 
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The null hypothesis for this study was that there is no relationship between 
Kentucky’s HB1 and the documented increase in heroin and synthetic opioid overdose 
rates. The alternative hypothesis was that there is a significant relationship between the 
passage of Kentucky’s HB1 and the documented increase in heroin and synthetic opioid 
overdose rates. In Chapter 4, I outline the data collection procedures and results of the 
analyses.  I describe the collection of secondary data for this study and discuss the 
analyses conducted for each research question, as well as the results of the individual 
analyses. 
Data Collection 
There were three sources for the data used in this study. First, data concerning 
opioid prescribing rates for Jefferson County, Kentucky were drawn from the CDC’s 
(n.d.) U.S. Opioid Prescribing Rate Maps. The CDC reports prescribing rate data for the 
years of 2006 through 2017. I used data from 2007 through 2017. 
Second, data concerning arrests for possession and trafficking of opioids were 
drawn from the Louisville Metro Police Department’s (LMPD, n.d.) crime reports. 
LMPD reports arrest data between the years of 2003 through 2019. I used arrest data 
from 2007 through 2017. 
Finally, data concerning opioid overdose fatalities were drawn from the CDC 
(n.d.) Wonder database. The database houses information about fatalities in the U.S. 
CDC Wonder database searches can be filtered to pinpoint specific causes of death. I 
used opioid overdose fatality data from 2007 through 2017. 
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All three databases are available to the general public on the Internet. No 
demographic information, such as age or sex, were used in this study. I was concerned 
with statistical significance between a specific public policy and overall fatality rates. 
Therefore, no demographic data was needed. 
The population for this study included all residents of Jefferson County, Kentucky 
during the years from 2007 to 2017. The mandates in HB1 apply equally to all residents 
of Kentucky. To be included in this study, residents of Jefferson County must have either 
died from an opioid overdose or been arrested for possession or trafficking of opioids. 
Results 
Research Question 1a: Have Opioid Prescribing Rates Decreased After the 
Implementation of Kentucky’s HB1? 
 A visual inspection of the related data revealed that there was a decrease in opioid 
prescribing rates in Jefferson County, Kentucky after the implementation of HB1. As can 
be seen in Figure 1, opioid prescribing rates in Jefferson County, Kentucky peaked in 
2008 with 136.5 prescriptions per 100 U.S. residents. This statistic indicates that some 
Jefferson County residents received multiple opioid prescriptions throughout 2008. The 
number of residents receiving prescriptions is not clear because the CDC only reports the 
overall prescription rate. It is also unclear how many prescriptions, on average, each 
patient received. Prescribing rates had begun to decrease in 2011 but not as dramatically 
as in 2012, the year that HB1 was implemented, and the following years. Opioid 
prescribing rates continued to decrease following the passage of HB1 in 2012. Opioid 
prescribing rates have decreased after the implementation of Kentucky’s HB1. The opioid 
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prescribing rate in Jefferson county initially decreased from 130.8 prescriptions per 100 
U.S. residents to 114.3 prescriptions per 100 U.S. residents in 2012. The downward trend 
slowed but continued from 2012 through 2017, when the prescribing rate in Jefferson 
County was 76.5 prescriptions per 100 U.S. residents. 
 
Figure 1. Yearly prescribing rates for Jefferson County, Kentucky. 
Research Question 1b: Have Arrest Rates for Possession of Heroin and Synthetic 
Opioids Increased After the Implementation of Kentucky’s HB1? 
 As can be seen in Figure 2, arrest rates for possession of heroin and synthetic 
opioids peaked in 2016 with 1381 arrests. Arrest rates had shown an increase but had 
remained relatively stable between 2007 and 2011. The arrest rate for possession of 
heroin and synthetic opioids increased from 107 arrests in 2006 to 436 in 2012, the year 
that HB1 was implemented. The arrest rate continued to increase until it peaked at 1,381 
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arrests in 2016. This increase indicates a dramatic rise in demand for heroin and synthetic 
opioids beginning in 2012, the year that HB1 was implemented. 
 
 
Figure 2. Jefferson County arrests for possession of heroin and synthetic opioids. 
Research Question 1c: Have arrest rates for trafficking of heroin and synthetic 
opioids increased after the implementation of Kentucky’s HB1? 
 As can be seen in Figure 3, trafficking in heroin and synthetic opioids peaked in 
2016 with 372 arrests. Prior to 2012 the arrest rates for trafficking of heroin and synthetic 
opioids increased slightly but remained relatively stable. The arrest rate for trafficking of 
heroin and synthetic opioids in Jefferson County, Kentucky increased from 46 arrests in 
2011 to 147 arrests in 2012, the year that HB1 was implemented. Arrest rates for 
trafficking of heroin and synthetic opioids continued to increase from 147 arrests in 2012 
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until the arrest rate peaked in 2016 at 372 arrests. This increase indicates a rise in supply 
of heroin and synthetic opioids in Jefferson County, Kentucky beginning in 2012. 
 
Figure 3. Jefferson County arrests for trafficking heroin and synthetic opioids. 
Research Questions 1d Through 1g 
 For research questions 4 through 7, data of three variables from 2007 to 2017 (See 
Table 1) were retrieved from the CDC.  
• Prescribing rate: Prescribing rate contains data that was collected from the CDC 
prescribing rate maps at https://www.cdc.gov/drugoverdose/maps/rxrate-
maps.html . The prescribing rate represents retail opioid prescriptions dispensed 
per 100 persons per year. 
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• Mortality of opioids: Mortality of prescription opioids contains data from the 
CDC Wonder database concerning the number of prescription opioid deaths per 
year in Jefferson County, Kentucky. 
• Mortality of heroin and synthetic opioids: Mortality of heroin and synthetic 
opioids contains data from the CDC Wonder database concerning the number of 
heroin and synthetic opioid deaths per year in Jefferson County, Kentucky. 
Note that the intervention, Kentucky’s HB1, was passed in February of 2012.  
The purpose of research questions 4 through 7 was two-fold. First, to determine 
the effect of the intervention on the three outcome measures (Prescribing rate, mortality 
of opioids, and mortality of heroin and synthetic opioids; Objective 1). Second, to 
determine the relationships between the two mortality measures (mortality of opioids and 










Mortality of heroin and synthetic 
opioids 
2007 125.2 0 0 
2008 136.5 11 0 
2009 131.8 18 0 
2010 133.3 19 0 
2011 130.8 52 12 
2012 114.3 41 37 
2013 96.8 34 62 
2014 95.5 39 39 
2015 88.5 27 87 
2016 83.4 54 177 




Research questions 1a through 1c were analyzed by simply reviewing the data listed 
in the CDC’s (n.d.) prescribing rate maps and the LMPD online arrest database. Research 
questions 1a through 1c are as follows: 
1a. Have opioid prescribing rates decreased after the implementation of Kentucky’s 




1b. Have arrest rates for possession of heroin and synthetic opioids increased after the 
implementation of Kentucky’s HB1? Research question 1b was analyzed by 
reviewing the LMPD’s (n.d.) arrest statistics for the years of 2007 through 2017. 
1c. Have arrest rates for trafficking of heroin and synthetic opioids increased after the 
implementation of Kentucky’s HB1? Research question 1c was also analyzed by 
reviewing the LMPD’s (n.d.) arrest statistics for the years of 2007 through 2017. 
Research Questions 1d Through 1g 
Data were imported into and analyzed using SPSS version 23 for Windows (IBM 
Corp., Armonk, NY). Time-series analysis is used when observations are made 
repeatedly over a period of time. The time series model used in this study was auto-
regressive, integrated, moving average, called ARIMA (p, d, q) model. The auto-
regressive element, p, represents the lingering effects of the preceding scores. The 
integrated element, d, represents trends in the data, and the moving average element, q, 
represents the lingering effects of preceding random shocks (Yaffee and McGee, 2000; 
Tabachnick and Fidell, 2013).  
Time series may be stationary or nonstationary (Yaffee and McGee, 2000). 
Nonstationary series have systematic trends (ex: linear and quadratic), while a stationary 
process has a constant mean and variance over the time period of the study (Tabachnick 
and Fidell, 2013). For ARIMA models, the time series need to be stationary (Yaffee and 
McGee, 2000). The middle element, d, should hence be investigated before p and q. The 
goal is to determine if the process is stationary and, if not, to make it stationary before 
determining the values of p and q. For each study variable (Prescribing rate, mortality of 
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opioids, and mortality of heroin and synthetic opioids), stationarity was examined by 
investigating the figure of the sequence over the time period, and the figures of 
autocorrelation functions (ACFs) and partial autocorrelation functions (PACFs). 
Autocorrelations are self-correlations of the series of scores with itself, removed one or 
more periods in time (Tabachnick and Fidell, 2013). In other words, the ACF show the 
correlation in a series between one observation and another observation in the same series 
k lags away (Yaffee and McGee, 2000). Partial autocorrelations are self-correlations with 
intermediate autocorrelations partialed out (Tabachnick and Fidell, 2013). The PACF, 
when working at k lags, controls for the confounding autocorrelations in the intermediate 
lags, with the purpose of partial out those autocorrelations, leaving only the 
autocorrelation between the current and kth observation (Yaffee and McGee, 2000). 
If a series is stationary, the line of the sequence over the time period will be 
basically horizontal with constant variance and the magnitude of the autocorrelation 
attenuates fairly rapidly, whereas if the series is nonstationary, the line will not be 
horizontal with constant variance and the autocorrelation diminishes gradually or 
demonstrates wild fluctuation before it drops below the level of significance (Yaffee and 
McGee, 2000; Tabachnick and Fidell, 2013; IBM Corp., 2015). Differencing (i.e., 
subtracting the value of an earlier observation from the value of a later observation) was 
undertaken if the time series was not stationary (Tabachnick and Fidell, 2013). For 
nonstationary series, d-values of 1 or 2 are usually adequate to make the mean stationary 
(Tabachnick and Fidell, 2013). 
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The basic processes of the ARIMA (p, d, q) model include the autoregressive 
process (p), the integrated process (d), and the moving average process (q). After 
ensuring the series are stationary, the next step is identification in which ACFs and 
PACFs are examined to see which of the potential patterns are present in the data for the 
autoregressive process and the moving average process (Yaffee and McGee, 2000; 
Tabachnick and Fidell, 2013; IBM Corp., 2015). The general guidelines for identifying 
the process are: 
• Autoregressive processes have an exponentially declining ACF and spikes in the 
first one or more lags of the PACF. The number of spikes indicates the order of 
the autoregression (p). 
• Moving average processes have spikes in the first one or more lags of the ACF 
and an exponentially declining PACF. The number of spikes indicates the order of 
the moving average (q). 
• Mixed processes typically show exponential declines in both the ACF and the 
PACF. 
In addition to the guidelines for identifying the ARIMA processes, the Expert 
Modeler modeling procedure in SPSS (IBM Corp., 2015) was used to find the initial best 
fitting ARIMA model for each dependent series (Penfold and Zhang, 2013). 
Analysis Methods for Objective 1 
 Research questions 1d through 1f. Research questions 1d through 1f were 




1d. Is there a statistically significant difference in the opioid prescribing rate after the 
implementation of HB1? 
1e. Is there a statistically significant difference in the prescription opioid overdose 
fatality rate after the implementation of HB1? 
1f. Is there a statistically significant difference in the heroin and synthetic opioid 
overdose fatality rate after the implementation of HB1? 
Interrupted time-series (ITS) analysis (Wagner, Soumerai, Zhang, & Ross-
Degnan, 2002; Penfold and Zhang, 2013) was conducted to determine the effect of the 
intervention on the three outcome measures (Prescribing rate, mortality of opioids, and 
mortality of heroin and synthetic opioids) (Objective 1). There were three dependent 
variables, including prescribing rate, mortality of opioids, and mortality of heroin and 
synthetic opioids, and one independent variable, the intervention. Equation 1 presents the 
time series regression equation: 
Yt = β0 + β1*T1t + β2*It + β3*T2t + et  ……………………………………. (Equation 1) 
where  
• Yt is the outcome variable in year t;  
• T1t is a continuous variable indicating time in year at time t from the start of the 
observation period (T1 = 1, 2, …, 11);  
• It is an indicator variable equal to 0 before the intervention and equal to 1 after the 
intervention;  
• T2t represents time after intervention, equal to 0 before the intervention and equal 
to the number of months after the intervention;  
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• The error term et represents the random error not explained by the model, 
consisting of normally distributed random error and an error at time t that may be 
correlated to errors at preceding time points.  
Table 2 presents the example data format for the ITS analysis. Coefficient β0 
estimated the yearly value of the outcome variable at baseline (2007); β1 estimated the 
baseline slope parameter representing change in the outcome variable that occurred every 
year before the intervention; β2 was change in the outcome variable immediately after the 
intervention (intercept changes); β3 estimated yearly change in outcome variable 
compared with trend before the intervention (slope changes). Thus, sum of β1 and β3 was 
the post-intervention slope.  
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Table 2.  
Example Data Format for ITS Analysis 
Year Prescribing rate 
(Yt) 
Time (T1t) Intervention 
(It) 
Time after intervention 
(T2t) 
2007 125.2 1 0 0 
2008 136.5 2 0 0 
2009 131.8 3 0 0 
2010 133.3 4 0 0 
2011 130.8 5 0 0 
2012 114.3 6 1 1 
2013 96.8 7 1 2 
2014 95.5 8 1 3 
2015 88.5 9 1 4 
2016 83.4 10 1 5 
2017 76.5 11 1 6 
 
 
Analysis Methods for Objective 2  
 Research question 1g. Is there a statistically significant relationship between 
prescribing rates and heroin and synthetic opioid overdose fatality rates? 
Objective 2 was to determine the relationships between the two mortality 
measures (mortality of opioids and mortality of heroin and synthetic opioids) and 
prescribing rate. ARIMA models with mortality of opioids and mortality of heroin and 
synthetic opioids as the dependent variables and prescribing rate as the independent 
variable were performed.  
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Assumptions of Time-Series Analysis 
For each analysis performed, the following assumptions of time-series analysis 
were examined (Yaffee and McGee, 2000; Tabachnick and Fidell, 2013). 
• Normality of residuals: Normality of the residuals was checked using the Shapiro-
Wilk normality tests. The Shapiro–Wilk test examines the null hypothesis that a 
sample came from a normally distributed population (Moore et al., 2009). A p 
value less than 0.05 indicates that the null hypothesis should be rejected and there 
is enough evidence to claim that the data tested are not from a normally 
distributed population, i.e., the data are not normal. On the contrary, if the p value 
is greater than 0.05, then the null hypothesis that the data came from a normally 
distributed population cannot be rejected, and hence there is not enough evidence 
to claim that the data tested are not from a normally distributed population, i.e., 
the data are normal. 
• Homogeneity of variance and zero mean of residuals: Plots of standardized 
residuals versus predicted values were used to assess homogeneity of variance 
over time. This assumption would be satisfied if the data points were randomly 
distributed around the 0-horizontal line. 
• Independence of residuals: ACFs and PACFs for the residuals were used to 
examine this assumption. Once the model is developed and residuals are 
computed, there should be no remaining autocorrelations or partial 
autocorrelations at various lags in the ACFs and PACFs. The Ljung-Box Q (LBQ) 
statistics were used to test the null hypothesis that autocorrelations up to lag k 
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equal zero (that is, the data values are random and independent up to a certain 
number of lags). In addition, figures of the ACFs and the PACFS were checked to 
ensure that all ACFs and PACFs were within the 95% confidence bounds (an 
indication of no significant autocorrelations or partial autocorrelations) 
If any of the assumptions were violated, different ARIMA models (ex: 
ARIMA (1,1,0)) were performed, and results were examined and compared to the 
initial ARIMA (0,1,0) model. For any analysis, a p value less than 0.05 was 
considered significant. 
Analysis Results 
Figures 4-6 are the plots of the three study variables, including, prescribing rate, 
mortality of opioids, and mortality of heroin and synthetic opioids, between 2007 and 
2017. For prescribing rate, the mean seemed edging downwards, whereas for the two 
mortality measures, the means seemed going upwards. As the mean was changing for 
each variable, the series may not be stationary, and the trend may be removed by 
differencing.  
Table 3 and Figures 7-9 present the ACFs and PACFs for the three time series 
variables. For prescribing rate, the autocorrelation diminished gradually; for mortality of 
opioids and mortality of heroin and synthetic opioids, the autocorrelation demonstrated 
some fluctuation over time. These may be indications that the series were not stationary. 
Based on the results of sequence plots, ACFs, and PACFs, all three series were 




Figure 4. Sequence of prescribing rate over time (The dash line represents the occurrence 




Figure 5. Sequence of mortality of opioids over time (The dash line represents the 




Figure 6. Sequence of mortality of heroin and synthetic opioids over time (The dash line 






ACFs and PACFs for the Three Time Series Variables 
    Box-Ljung Statistic   
DV Lag Autocorrelation SE Value df p Partial 
autocorrelation 
SE 
1 1 .781 .302 8.725 1 .003 .781 .302 
 2 .502 .449 12.732 2 .002 -.277 .302 
 3 .222 .498 13.616 3 .003 -.173 .302 
 4 -.063 .507 13.696 4 .008 -.247 .302 
 5 -.354 .507 16.690 5 .005 -.326 .302 
 6 -.467 .529 22.916 6 .001 .154 .302 
 7 -.423 .566 29.313 7 .000 .132 .302 
 8 -.346 .594 35.022 8 .000 -.105 .302 
 9 -.254 .612 39.618 9 .000 -.117 .302 
2 1 .416 .302 2.477 1 .115 .416 .302 
 2 .089 .350 2.604 2 .272 -.102 .302 
 3 .050 .352 2.648 3 .449 .063 .302 
 4 -.193 .353 3.406 4 .492 -.283 .302 
 5 .093 .362 3.613 5 .606 .393 .302 
 6 .075 .364 3.773 6 .707 -.256 .302 
 7 -.209 .366 5.330 7 .620 -.133 .302 
 8 -.190 .376 7.045 8 .532 -.177 .302 
 9 -.351 .385 15.864 9 .070 -.140 .302 
3 1 .547 .302 4.272 1 .039 .547 .302 
 2 .201 .381 4.914 2 .086 -.140 .302 
 3 .054 .391 4.966 3 .174 .007 .302 
 4 .026 .391 4.979 4 .289 .024 .302 
 5 -.123 .391 5.340 5 .376 -.208 .302 
 6 -.229 .395 6.841 6 .336 -.096 .302 
 7 -.262 .407 9.297 7 .232 -.096 .302 
 8 -.281 .422 13.063 8 .110 -.146 .302 
 9 -.262 .439 17.954 9 .036 -.062 .302 
Note: For DV (dependent variable), 1 = Prescribing rate, 2 = Mortality of opioids, and 3 = 
Mortality of heroin and synthetic opioids. SE = standard error, df = degrees of freedom, p 




Figure 7. Figures of ACFs (right) and PACFs (left) for prescribing rate. 
 
Figure 8. Figures of ACFs (right) and PACFs (left) for mortality of opioids. 
 





Table 4 presents the three measures of the study (original scale and lag 1 
differences). Figures 10-12 are the plots of the lag 1 differences of the three study 
variables, including, prescribing rate, mortality of opioids, and mortality of heroin and 
synthetic opioids, against time. The three measures appeared to be more stationary with 
respect to central tendency after lag 1 differencing. Table 5 and Figures 13-15 present the 
ACFs and PACFs for the lag 1 differences for the three time series variables. For all three 
variables, the autocorrelations were fairly small and insignificant. For the prescribing 
rate, the autocorrelation values ranged from a low of -.311 at lag 5 to a high of .139 at lag 
1. For the mortality of prescription opioids, the autocorrelation values ranged from a low 
of -.496 at lag 4 to a high of .209 at lag 5. For the mortality of heroin and synthetic 
opioids, the autocorrelation values ranged from -.294 at lag 7 to a high of .471 at lag 1. 
Thus, we concluded that the data were stationary after differencing once (d = 1). 
The results of the ACFs and PACFs for the lag 1 differences of the three measures 
(Figures 13-15) were also used to determine if potential patterns are present in the data 
for the autoregressive process and the moving average process. As there were no obvious 
spikes or exponentially declining in the ACFs and PACFs for all three measures, it may 
be reasonable to set p = 0 and q = 0 for the initial ARIMA models. In other words, an 
ARIMA (0, 1, 0) model was identified as the initial best fitting ARIMA model for each 
dependent series in this study. The results for identifying the ARIMA processes using the 
Expert Modeler modeling procedure in SPSS confirmed the choice of the ARIMA (0, 1, 




Data of the Study (Original Scale and Lag 1 Differences) 
 Prescribing rate Mortality of 
opioids 











Original value Lag 1 difference 
2007 125.2 . 0 . 0 . 
2008 136.5 11.3 11 11 0 0 
2009 131.8 -4.7 18 7 0 0 
2010 133.3 1.5 19 1 0 0 
2011 130.8 -2.5 52 33 12 12 
2012 114.3 -16.5 41 -11 37 25 
2013 96.8 -17.5 34 -7 62 25 
2014 95.5 -1.3 39 5 39 -23 
2015 88.5 -7 27 -12 87 48 
2016 83.4 -5.1 54 27 177 90 
2017 76.5 -6.9 69 15 275 98 





Figure 10. Sequence of prescribing rate over time (Lag 1 differences) (The dash line 
represents the occurrence of the intervention). 
 
 
Figure 11. Sequence of mortality of opioids over time (Lag 1 differences) (The dash line 





Figure 12. Sequence of mortality of heroin and synthetic opioids over time (Lag 1 






ACFs and PACFs for the Three Time Series Variables (Lag 1 Differences) 
Box-Ljung statistic 
DV Lag Autocorrelation SE Value df p Partial 
autocorrelation 
SE 
1 1 .139 .316 .256 1 .613 .139 .316 
 2 -.019 .322 .262 2 .877 -.039 .316 
 3 -.024 .322 .272 3 .965 -.017 .316 
 4 -.231 .323 1.340 4 .855 -.231 .316 
 5 -.311 .339 3.663 5 .599 -.267 .316 
 6 .082 .366 3.865 6 .695 .151 .316 
 7 -.076 .368 4.096 7 .769 -.142 .316 
 8 -.007 .370 4.098 8 .848 -.032 .316 
2 1 -.254 .316 .859 1 .354 -.254 .316 
 2 -.083 .336 .964 2 .618 -.158 .316 
 3 .087 .338 1.094 3 .778 .025 .316 
 4 -.496 .340 6.006 4 .199 -.523 .316 
 5 .209 .406 7.054 5 .217 -.078 .316 
 6 .040 .417 7.102 6 .312 -.099 .316 
 7 -.059 .417 7.243 7 .404 -.074 .316 
 8 .040 .418 7.339 8 .501 -.356 .316 
3 1 .471 .316 2.953 1 .086 .471 .316 
 2 -.024 .380 2.962 2 .227 -.315 .316 
 3 -.169 .380 3.449 3 .327 -.007 .316 
 4 .061 .387 3.523 4 .474 .229 .316 
 5 -.017 .388 3.530 5 .619 -.312 .316 
 6 -.138 .388 4.104 6 .663 .018 .316 
 7 -.294 .393 7.556 7 .373 -.223 .316 
 8 -.255 .415 11.444 8 .178 -.143 .316 
Note: For DV (dependent variable), 1 = Prescribing rate, 2 = Mortality of opioids, and 3 = 
Mortality of heroin and synthetic opioids. SE = standard error, df = degrees of freedom, p 




Figure 13. Figures of ACFs (right) and PACFs (left) for prescribing rate (Lag 1 
differences). 
  






Figure 15. Figures of ACFs (right) and PACFs (left) for mortality of heroin and synthetic 
opioids (Lag 1 differences). 
 
Analysis Results for Objective 1 
ITS Analysis of Prescribing Rate 
Table 6 shows the results of ITS analysis of prescribing rate. The R2 = 0.957, 
indicating that approximately 95.7% of the total variation in the series could be explained 
by the model. The term for baseline trend (β1) indicated that before the intervention, there 
was no significant year-to-year change in terms of the lag 1 differences of prescribing 
rate (Yt-Yt-1) (p = 0.231). The term for level change after intervention (β2), indicated that 
immediately following the intervention, the lag 1 difference of prescribing rate (Yt-Yt-1) 
did not change significantly (p = 0.127). The term for trend changes after intervention 
(β3) indicated that there was no significant year-to-year change in terms of the lag 1 




The assumptions of the time-series analysis were examined (Figures 16-17 and 
Table 7). Normality of the residuals was checked using the Shapiro-Wilk normality test 
and the assumption was satisfied (W (10) = 0.982, p = 0.973). The assumption of 
homogeneity of variance and zero mean of residuals was checked using the plot of 
standardized residuals versus predicted values (see Figure 16) and was satisfied as the 
data points were randomly distributed around the 0-horizontal line. The assumption of 
independence of residuals was evaluated using ACFs and PACFs of the residuals (Table 
7 and Figure 17) and was satisfied as 1) all results of the Ljung-Box Q tests were not 
significant (p > 0.05, Table 7), and 2) all ACFs and PACFs were within the 95% 
confidence bounds (Figure 17). 
 
Table 6.  
Results of ITS Analysis of Prescribing Rate 
 Coefficient SE t p 
Intercept (β0) 13.720 9.712 1.413 .207 
Baseline trend (β1) -3.520 2.643 -1.332 .231 
Level change after intervention (β2) -13.120 7.398 -1.774 .127 
Trend change after intervention (β3) 5.791 2.997 1.932 .102 
Note: An ARIMA (0, 1, 0) model was employed. R2 = 0.957. SE = standard error, t = t 









ACFs and PACFs for the Residuals 
Box-Ljung statistic 
Lag Autocorrelation SE Value df p Partial 
autocorrelation 
SE 
1 -.382 .316 1.942 1 .163 -.382 .316 
2 -.149 .359 2.275 2 .321 -.345 .316 
3 -.060 .365 2.337 3 .506 -.356 .316 
4 .315 .366 4.324 4 .364 .095 .316 
5 -.403 .393 8.220 5 .145 -.383 .316 
6 .143 .432 8.834 6 .183 -.168 .316 
7 -.032 .437 8.874 7 .262 -.299 .316 






Figure 17. Figures of ACFs (right) and PACFs (left) for the residuals. 
 
ITS Analysis of Mortality of Opioids 
Table 8 shows the results of ITS analysis of mortality of opioids, with ARIMA 
(1,1,1) modeling. Appendix A shows the ARIMA models that were fit but deemed 
inappropriate due to violation of model assumptions. The R2 = 0.859, indicating that 
approximately 85.9% of the total variation in the series could be explained by the model. 
The term for baseline trend (β1) indicated that before the intervention, there was no 
significant year-to-year change in terms of the lag 1 difference of mortality of opioids (Yt-
Yt-1) (p = 0.277). The term for level change after intervention (β2), indicated that 
immediately following the intervention, the lag 1 difference of mortality of opioids (Yt-Yt-
1) significantly dropped by 40.033 (p = 0.043). The term for trend change after 
intervention (β3) indicated that there was no significant year-to-year change in terms of 
the lag 1 differences of mortality of opioids (Yt-Yt-1), comparing to trend before the 
intervention (p = 0.960). 
The assumptions of the time-series analysis were examined (Figures 18-19 and 
Table 9). Normality of the residuals was checked using the Shapiro-Wilk normality test 
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and the assumption was satisfied (W (10) = 0.655, p = 0.078). The assumption of 
homogeneity of variance and zero mean of residuals was checked using the plot of 
standardized residuals versus predicted values (see Figure 18) and was satisfied as the 
data points were randomly distributed around the 0-horizontal line. The assumption of 
independence of residuals was evaluated using ACFs and PACFs of the residuals (see 
Table 9 and Figure 10) and was satisfied as 1) all results of the Ljung-Box Q tests were 
not significant (p > 0.05, Table 9), and 2) all ACFs and PACFs were within the 95% 
confidence bounds (see Figure 19). 
 
Table 8.  
Results of ITS Analysis of Mortality of Opioids 
 Coefficient SE t p 
Intercept (β0) -8.619 16.811 -.513 .635 
Baseline trend (β1) 5.971 4.750 1.257 .277 
Level change after intervention (β2) -40.033 13.676 -2.927 .043 
Trend change after intervention (β3) .220 4.135 .053 .960 
Note: An ARIMA(1, 1, 1) model was employed. R2 = 0.859. SE = standard error, t = t 





Figure 18. Plot of standardized residuals and predicted values. 
 
Table 9.  
ACFs and PACFs for the Residuals 
Box-Ljung statistic 
Lag Autocorrelation SE Value df p Partial 
autocorrelation 
SE 
1 -.122 .316 .200 1 .655 -.122 .316 
2 -.389 .321 2.471 2 .291 -.410 .316 
3 -.174 .365 2.992 3 .393 -.356 .316 
4 -.095 .373 3.174 4 .529 -.528 .316 
5 .420 .376 7.405 5 .192 -.044 .316 
6 .034 .420 7.440 6 .282 -.254 .316 
7 -.223 .420 9.425 7 .224 -.269 .316 





   
 
Figure 19. Figures of ACFs (right) and PACFs (left) for the residuals. 
 
ITS Analysis of Mortality of Heroin and Synthetic Opioids 
Table 10 shows the results of ITS analysis of mortality of heroin and synthetic 
opioids, with ARIMA (2,1,0) modeling. Appendix B shows the ARIMA models that were 
fit but deemed inappropriate due to violation of model assumptions. The R2 = 0.970, 
indicating that approximately 97.0% of the total variation in the series could be explained 
by the model. The term for baseline trend (β1) indicated that before the intervention, there 
was no significant year-to-year change in terms of the lag 1 difference of mortality of 
heroin and synthetic opioids (Yt-Yt-1) (p = 0.139). The term for level change after 
intervention (β2), indicated that immediately following the intervention, the lag 1 
difference of mortality of heroin and synthetic opioids (Yt-Yt-1) did not change 
significantly (p = 0.372). The term for trend changes after intervention (β3) indicated that 
there was no significant year-to-year change in terms of the mortality of heroin and 
synthetic opioids (Yt-Yt-1), comparing to trend before the intervention (p = 0.472). 
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The assumptions of the time-series analysis were examined (see Figures 20-21 
and Table 11). Normality of the residuals was checked using the Shapiro-Wilk normality 
test and the assumption was satisfied (W(10) = 0.970, p = 0.890). The assumption of 
homogeneity of variance and zero mean of residuals was checked using the plot of 
standardized residuals versus predicted values (Figure 20) and was satisfied as the data 
points were randomly distributed around the 0 horizontal line. The assumption of 
independence of residuals was evaluated using ACFs and PACFs of the residuals (see 
Table 11 and Figure 21) and was satisfied as 1) all results of the Ljung-Box Q tests were 
not significant (p > 0.05, Table 11), and 2) all ACFs and PACFs were within the 95% 
confidence bounds (see Figure 21). 
 
 
Table 10.  
Results of ITS Analysis of Mortality of Heroin and Synthetic Opioids 
 Coefficient SE t p 
Intercept (β0) -30.924 39.598 -.781 .470 
Baseline trend (β1) 10.673 10.884 .981 .372 
Level change after intervention (β2) -50.443 28.698 -1.758 .139 
Trend change after intervention (β3) 8.349 10.749 .777 .472 
Note: An ARIMA(2, 1, 0) model was employed. ).”  = 0.970. SE = standard error, t = t 







Figure 20. Plot of standardized residuals and predicted values. 
 
Table 11.  
ACFs and PACFs for the Residuals 
Box-Ljung statistic 
Lag Autocorrelation SE Value df p Partial 
autocorrelation 
SE 
1 -.384 .316 1.970 1 .160 -.384 .316 
2 -.179 .360 2.453 2 .293 -.384 .316 
3 -.011 .369 2.455 3 .483 -.350 .316 
4 -.007 .369 2.456 4 .652 -.395 .316 
5 .231 .369 3.735 5 .588 -.086 .316 
6 -.150 .383 4.407 6 .622 -.161 .316 
7 .022 .389 4.427 7 .730 -.013 .316 





   
 
Figure 21. Figures of ACFs (right) and PACFs (left) for the residuals. 
 
Analysis Results of Objective 2 
Objective 2 was to determine the relationships between the two mortality 
measures (mortality of opioids and mortality of heroin and synthetic opioids) and 
prescribing rate. ARIMA(0, 0, 0) models with lag 1 differences of mortality of opioids 
and mortality of heroin and synthetic opioids as the dependent variables and lag 1 
differences of prescribing rate as the independent variable were performed.  
Figures 22 and 23 present the scatter plots of lag 1 differences of mortality of 
opioids and mortality of heroin and synthetic opioids, and lag 1 differences of prescribing 
rate. Table 12 presents the results of bivariate time-series analyses. It appeared that there 
was no statistically significant relationship between prescribing rate (in terms of lag 1 
differences of prescribing rate) and mortality of opioids (in terms of lag 1 differences of 
mortality of opioids) (t = 1.338, p = 0.218). There was also no statistically significant 
relationship between prescribing rate (in terms of lag 1 differences of prescribing rate) 
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and mortality of heroin and synthetic opioids (in terms of lag 1 differences of mortality of 
heroin and synthetic opioids) (t = -0.982, p = 0.355). 
The assumptions of the time-series analysis were examined (see Figures 24-27 
and Tables 13-14). Normality of the residuals was checked using the Shapiro-Wilk 
normality test and the assumption was satisfied for both models (W(10) = 0.900, p = 
0.220; W(10) = 0.856, p = 0.068). The assumption of homogeneity of variance and zero 
mean of residuals was checked using the plot of standardized residuals versus predicted 
values (see Figures 24-25) and was satisfied as the data points were randomly distributed 
around the 0 horizontal line. The assumption of independence of residuals was evaluated 
using ACFs and PACFs of the residuals (see Table 14 and Figures 26-27) and was 
satisfied as 1) all results of the Ljung-Box Q tests were not significant (p > 0.05, Table 










Figure 23. scatter plot of lag 1 differences of mortality of heroin and synthetic opioids 





Table 12.  
Results of Bivariate Analyses 
DV  Coefficient SE t p R2 
Lag 1 differences of 
mortality of opioids 
Intercept (β0) 10.699 5.411 1.977 .083 0.183 
 Slope (β1) .780 .583 1.338 .218  
Lag 1 differences of 
mortality of heroin and 
synthetic opioids 
Intercept (β0) 19.835 14.873 1.334 .219 0.108 
 Slope (β1) -1.574 1.603 -.982 .355 -
1.574 
Note: Two ARIMA(0, 0, 0) models were employed. R2 = 0.970. SE = standard error, t = t 




Results of Shapiro-Wilk Tests 
DV W df p 
Lag 1 differences of mortality of 
opioids 
.900 10 .220 
Lag 1 differences of mortality of 
heroin and synthetic opioids 






Figure 24. Plot of standardized residuals and predicted values (DV = Lag 1 differences of 




Figure 25. Plot of standardized residuals and predicted values (DV = Lag 1 differences of 





Table 14.  
ACFs and PACFs for the Residuals 
Box-Ljung statistic 
DV Lag Autocorrelation SE Value df p Partial 
autocorrelation 
SE 
1 1 -.292 .316 1.133 1 .287 -.292 .316 
 2 -.036 .342 1.153 2 .562 -.132 .316 
 3 -.148 .342 1.528 3 .676 -.221 .316 
 4 -.301 .349 3.334 4 .504 -.497 .316 
 5 .370 .374 6.623 5 .250 .038 .316 
 6 .032 .409 6.655 6 .354 .074 .316 
 7 .024 .409 6.678 7 .463 -.028 .316 
 8 -.102 .409 7.301 8 .505 -.129 .316 
2 1 .540 .316 3.895 1 .058 .540 .316 
 2 -.008 .398 3.896 2 .143 -.424 .316 
 3 -.254 .398 5.002 3 .172 -.033 .316 
 4 -.122 .414 5.300 4 .258 .146 .316 
 5 -.091 .418 5.498 5 .358 -.289 .316 
 6 -.176 .419 6.424 6 .377 -.099 .316 
 7 -.226 .427 8.474 7 .293 -.037 .316 
 8 -.153 .439 9.877 8 .274 -.120 .316 
Note: DV 1 = Lag 1 differences of mortality of opioids, 2 = Lag 1 differences of 






Figure 26. Figures of ACFs (right) and PACFs (left) for the residuals (DV = Lag 1 
differences of mortality of opioids). 
 
 
Figure 27. Figures of ACFs (right) and PACFs (left) for the residuals (DV = Lag 1 
differences of mortality of heroin and synthetic opioids). 
Summary 
A brief summary of the findings for each research questions is outlined. Research 
questions 1a through 1c were answered with a simple review of the data for each 
category: prescribing rates, arrest rates for possession of heroin and synthetic opioids, and 
arrests rates for trafficking of heroin and synthetic opioids. Research questions 1d 
through 1g were answered through interrupted time series analyses. 
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According to the CDC (n.d.) prescribing rate maps, opioid prescribing rates in 
Jefferson County, Kentucky did decrease after the passage of Kentucky’s HB1. The 
prescribing rate decreased from 130.8 prescriptions per 100 U.S. citizens in 2011 to 114.3 
prescriptions per 100 U.S. citizens in 2012. Using these statistics, it is clear that some 
patients received multiple opioid prescriptions throughout each year. The prescribing rate 
in Jefferson County, KY continued to decrease after the passage of Kentucky’s HB1 to 
96.8 prescriptions per 100 U.S. citizens in 2013. The prescribing rates continued to 
decrease, although not as dramatically, from 2013 through 2017. In the context of this 
study, this decrease in prescriptions would indicate a decrease in the supply of 
prescription opioids. It should be noted that prescribing rates had begun a slight decrease 
prior to the passage of HB1. 
As per LMPD (n.d.) arrest data, the arrest rates for possession of heroin and 
synthetic opioids did increase. The arrest rate climbed from 107 arrests in 2011 to 436 
arrests in 2012. The arrest rate continued to climb after the passage of Kentucky’s HB1 in 
2012 to 792 arrests in 2013. The arrest rate continued to climb, peaking in 2016 at 1381 
arrests for possession of heroin and synthetic opioids. The arrest rate dropped in 2017 to 
1237 arrests. In the context of this study, the increase in arrest rates seems to indicate an 
increase in demand for heroin and synthetic opioids after the passage of Kentucky’s HB1 
in 2012. It could be argued that the increase in arrests could is the result of aggressive law 
enforcement actions. The simultaneous decrease in opioid prescriptions, resulting in 
fewer opioids available for diversion, considered along with the simultaneous increase in 
arrests for trafficking in heroin and synthetic opioids, leads this researcher to believe that 
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demand for heroin and synthetic opioids increased. Put another way, as there were fewer 
prescription opioids available to dealers and addicts, addicts began to demand more 
heroin and synthetic opioids. Using the statistics for arrests for trafficking in heroin and 
synthetic opioids, it seems apparent that drug dealers were ready to meet the supply for 
this new demand. It should be noted that arrest rates for possession of heroin and 
synthetic opioids had begun to climb prior to the passage of HB1. 
As per LMPD (n.d.) arrest data, the arrest rates for trafficking of heroin and 
synthetic opioids did increase. Arrest rates increased from 46 arrests in 2011 to 147 
arrests in 2012. Arrest rates continued to increase with 280 arrests in 2013. In the context 
of this study, the increase in arrests for trafficking in heroin and synthetic opioids 
indicates an increase in supply of heroin and synthetic opioids. Again, it could be argued 
that the increase in arrests could is the result of aggressive law enforcement actions. The 
simultaneous decrease in opioid prescriptions, resulting in fewer opioids available for 
diversion, considered along with the simultaneous increase in arrests for possession of 
heroin and synthetic opioids, leads this researcher to believe that supply of heroin and 
synthetic opioids increased. Put another way, this researcher believes that as there were 
fewer prescription opioids available to dealers, defined by the decrease in opioid 
prescriptions, dealers increased their supply of heroin and synthetic opioids to meet the 
demands of local opioid addicts. It should be noted that arrest rates for trafficking of 
heroin and synthetic opioids had begun to increase prior to the passage of HB1. 
An ARIMA model (0, 1, 0) was employed and it was determined that there were 
no significant changes in prescribing rates after the implementation of HB1. 95.7% of the 
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data variation can be explained by the model. This finding indicates that the 
implementation of HB1 had no significant effect prescribing rates in Jefferson County, 
KY. 
An ARIMA model (1, 1, 1) was employed and it was determined that there was a 
significant decrease in prescription opioid overdose fatality rates immediately after the 
implementation of HB1. 85.9% of the data variation can be explained by the model. This 
finding indicates that the implementation of HB1 had an immediate effect, decreasing the 
prescription opioid overdose rate in Jefferson County, KY. 
An ARIMA model (2, 1, 0) was employed and it was determined that there was 
no significant change in heroin and synthetic opioid overdose fatality rates after the 
implementation of HB1. 97.0% of the data variation can be explained by the model. This 
finding indicates that HB1 had no effect on the overdose fatality rates for heroin and 
synthetic opioids. 
An ARIMA model (0, 0, 0) was employed and it was determined that there was 
no significant relationship between prescribing rates and heroin and synthetic opioid 
overdose fatality rates in this study. In the following chapter, I provide the interpretation, 
recommendations, and implications of the current study. 
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Chapter 5: Interpretation, Recommendations, and Implications 
Introduction 
The research questions were designed to inquire about the state of supply and 
demand for prescription opioids and heroin and synthetic opioids in Jefferson County, 
Kentucky after the implementation of Kentucky’s HB1. The supply of prescription 
opioids was studied using data from the CDC’s (n.d.) prescribing rate maps and LMPD’s 
arrest records for trafficking of opioids. The demand for prescription opioids and heroin 
and synthetic opioids was studied using LMPD’s (n.d.) arrest records for possession of 
opioids and heroin and synthetic opioids. Precisely, this study was concerned with the 
goal of determining whether or not the implementation of Kentucky’s HB1 created an 
environment in which prescription opioid misusers made a rational choice to switch to 
heroin and synthetic opioid use. Such a switch to an unregulated, and more dangerous, 
illicit market drug would be expected to result in significant increases in opioid overdose 
fatalities overall. Thus, the ultimate goal of this study was to discover and quantify any 
relationships between the implementation of Kentucky’s HB1 and the documented 
increase in heroin and synthetic opioid overdose rates. 
Key Findings 
There were multiple key findings for this study. Research question 1a asked if 
prescribing rates decreased after the implementation of Kentucky’s HB1. This question 
was designed to be a measure of the supply of prescription opioids both before and after 
the implementation of Kentucky’s HB1. As can be seen in Figure 1, prescribing rates had 
begun to moderately decrease prior to the implementation of HB1 in 2012. However, a 
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dramatic decrease in prescribing rates was seen in 2012, the year in which Kentucky’s 
HB1 was implemented, and the decrease continued through 2017. Prescribing rates 
decreased after the implementation of HB1. A decrease in prescription opioid rates was 
interpreted to mean that the supply of prescription opioids had decreased and that, as a 
consequence, there would have been fewer prescription opioids available for diversion to 
the illicit opioid market. 
Research question 1b asked whether arrest rates for possession of heroin and 
synthetic opioids increased after the implementation of Kentucky’s HB1. Given the 
decrease in opioid prescription rates, it was theorized that the demand for heroin and 
synthetic opioids would increase because they would be used as replacement opioids. As 
can be seen in Figure 2, arrest rates for heroin and synthetic opioids increased moderately 
between 2007 and 2011. Arrest rates for possession of heroin and synthetic opioids 
dramatically increased in 2012 and continued to increase through 2016. Arrests rates for 
possession of heroin and synthetic opioids increased after the implementation of 
Kentucky’s HB1 in 2012. An increase in arrest rates for possession of heroin and 
synthetic opioids was interpreted as an increase in the demand for the illicitly 
manufactured drugs. 
Research question 1c asked whether trafficking of heroin and synthetic opioids 
increased after the implementation of Kentucky’s HB1. Arrest rates for trafficking of 
heroin and synthetic opioids had moderately increased from 2007 through 2011. As can 
be seen in Figure 3, arrest rates increased dramatically in 2012 and continued to climb 
through 2016. Arrest rates for trafficking of heroin and synthetic opioids increased after 
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the implementation of HB1. An increase in arrest rates for trafficking of heroin and 
synthetic opioids was interpreted as an increase in supply of heroin and synthetic opioids.  
Research questions 1a through 1c were intended to explore the aspects of supply 
and demand. The answers to research questions 1a through 1c indicate that there was a 
decrease in the supply of prescription opioids and a simultaneous increase in both supply 
and demand for heroin and synthetic opioids. These findings were consistent with the 
hypothesis that the implementation of HB1 could have created a supply and demand 
environment in which prescription opioid addicts might have made a rational choice to 
switch to heroin and synthetic opioid use. 
Research question 1d asked if there is a statistically significant difference in the 
prescription opioid overdose fatality rate after the implementation of HB1. As can be 
seen in Table 1, the opioid prescribing rate in Jefferson County, Kentucky remained 
somewhat stable between 2007 and 2011. Then in 2012, the year that HB1 was 
implemented, the prescribing rate began a continuous decrease through 2017. An 
interrupted time series study was conducted to determine the significance of the decrease. 
Interrupted time series analysis indicated that the trajectory of opioid prescribing rates did 
not significantly change as a direct result of the implementation of Kentucky’s HB1. 
Although prescribing rates did decrease, consistent with the goal of HB1, the decrease 
was not a direct result of the implementation of HB1. This finding also indicates any 
decrease in the supply of prescription opioids was not a direct result of the 
implementation of HB1. 
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Research question 1e asked if there is a statistically significant difference in the 
prescription opioid overdose fatality rate after the implementation of Kentucky’s HB1. 
As can be seen in Table 1, the mortality rate or prescription opioids trended downward 
for the first four years after the implementation of Kentucky’s HB1. After the initial 
downward trend, however, mortality rates began to climb again in 2016. An interrupted 
time series study was conducted to determine any significance of the relationship 
between HB1 and the decrease in prescription opioid overdose fatality incidents. An 
interrupted time series analysis indicated that the relationship between the downward 
trajectory of prescription opioid overdose fatalities and the implementation of Kentucky’s 
HB1 was significantly significant. This finding is consistent with the goals of HB1. 
Research question 1f asked if there is a statistically significant difference in the 
heroin and synthetic opioid overdose rate after the implementation of Kentucky’s HB1. 
As can be seen in Table 1, the mortality rate for heroin and synthetic opioid overdose was 
zero for the years of 2007 through 2010. In 2011, heroin and synthetic opioid overdose 
became an issue in Jefferson County, Kentucky. Beginning with 12 overdose fatalities in 
2011, the heroin and synthetic opioid overdose fatality rate continuously climbed each 
year to 275 overdose fatalities in 2017. An interrupted time series study was conducted to 
determine the significance of the increase to the implementation of Kentucky’s HB1. 
Although overdose fatality rates for heroin and synthetic opioids did increase after the 
implementation of HB1, interrupted time series analysis indicated that the increase was 
not significantly related to the implementation of Kentucky’s HB1. 
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Finally, research question 1g asked if there is a statistically significant 
relationship between prescribing rates and heroin and synthetic opioid overdose fatality 
rates. It can be seen in Table 1 that there was a decrease in opioid prescribing rates and a 
simultaneous increase in heroin and synthetic opioid overdose rates. An interrupted time 
series study was conducted to determine the significance of a possible relationship. 
Interrupted time series analysis indicated that the decrease in opioid prescribing rates was 
not significantly related to either the decrease in prescription opioid overdose fatality 
rates or the increase in heroin and synthetic opioid overdose fatality rates after the 
implementation of Kentucky’s HB1. This finding is inconsistent with the overall 
hypothesis that the implementation of HB1 had a causal effect on the increase in heroin 
and synthetic opioid overdose fatalities. 
Interpretation of the Findings 
 Public policy is expected to have consequences. The intended consequence of 
HB1 was that there would be a decrease in opioid prescriptions resulting in fewer 
prescription drugs available for diversion to the illicit market (Kentucky General 
Assembly, 2012). This intended consequence was expected lead to a reduction in 
overdose incidents. HB1 was intended to address all prescription drug overdose incidents. 
Opioids are a special class of prescription drugs in that there are illicit options to fulfill an 
addict’s needs. Heroin and illicitly produced synthetic opioids have traditionally filled the 
needs of addicts who cannot obtain regulated prescription opioids (Alpert et al., 2017; 
Cicero et al., 2014; Mars et al., 2014). 
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 Unintended consequences of public policy are not always easy to predict. A study 
by Alpert et al., (2017) found that oxycontin addicts switched to heroin use as a result of 
a change in the oxycontin formula that made the drug more difficult to crush and use 
illicitly. I was concerned with the same type of unintended consequence as a result of the 
implementation of Kentucky’s HB1. Specifically, I was concerned with identifying and 
quantifying any possible relationships between the implementation of Kentucky’s HB1 
and the documented increase in heroin and synthetic opioid overdose rates. 
 A reduction in prescriptions for opioids would mean that there were fewer 
prescription opioids available for diversion to the illicit market. Heroin and synthetic 
opioids can be manufactured in clandestine labs, thus bypassing the need for a doctor’s 
prescription. These illicitly produced opioids can be marketed and used outside of the 
reach of public policies concerning PDMPs. It was hypothesized in this study that if HB1 
resulted in fewer opioid prescriptions, opioid addicts were forced to make a rational 
choice: stop using opioids or seek out illicit alternatives. The hypothesis was not 
reinforced by this study. 
 Although the supply of prescription opioids did decrease while the demand for 
heroin and synthetic opioids increased, it does not appear that these findings were 
consistent with any relationship to the implementation of HB1. The findings of research 
questions 1a through 1c seem to indicate an environment in which a switch was made 
from prescription opioid abuse to heroin and synthetic opioid use. However, further 
findings for questions 1d, 1f, and 1g indicate that the environment was not induced by the 
implementation of HB1. Kentucky’s HB1 does not seem to have created an environment 
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in which opioid addicts were forced to make a rational choice to switch to heroin and 
synthetic opioid use. Neither the reduction of opioid prescriptions nor the increase in 
heroin and synthetic opioid overdose fatalities was found to be significantly related to the 
implementation of HB1. 
 The only significant relationship found in this study was between the 
implementation of HB1 and the decrease in prescription opioid overdose fatalities. This 
finding indicates that HB1 ultimately acted exactly as intended. The overall opioid 
fatality rates increased dramatically when after the implementation of HB1 when 
prescription opioids, heroin, and synthetic opioids are considered. However, HB1 was not 
intended to affect heroin and synthetic opioid overdose fatality rates, only prescription 
opioid overdose fatality rates. Since the overall goal of HB1 was to decrease the rate of 
prescription opioid overdose fatalities, HB1 could be considered a successful policy 
implementation. This study hypothesized that although the prescription opioid overdose 
fatality rate deceased, the overall opioid rate increased as a result of the implementation 
of Kentucky’s HB1. Had this been the case, HB1 would have ultimately been considered 
a failure for creating an environment in which more people ultimately died of opioid 
overdose. The results of this study do not find that this is the case. There was no 
relationship found between the implementation of HB1 and the rate of heroin and 
synthetic opioid overdose rates. Again, Kentucky’s HB1 should be considered a 




The major limitation for quasi-experimental designs is that there is no control 
group by which to compare actual results. The assumptions for interrupted time series 
studies are normality of the residuals, homogeneity of variance and zero mean of 
residuals, and independence of residuals. Results of this study rely on these assumptions. 
Further limitations include a human error and a lack of complete data for LMPD 
arrest records. All computer databases are susceptible to human error. Arresting officers 
input data concerning arrest charges. It would stand to reason that there might be some 
individual practices for inputting data and that this individualism might lead to 
inconsistencies. For example, some data in the LMPD arrest records includes arrests for 
generic controlled substance statutes that do not identify the drug seized. LMPD records 
include generic charges for possession of a controlled substance and trafficking of a 
controlled substance. It could be inferred that some of these arrests include arrests for 
opioids. However, none of these statistics could be used in this study due to a lack of 
identification of drug type possessed or trafficked by the arrestee. 
Recommendations 
Future Policy Indications 
 This study adds to the body of knowledge proclaiming success for PDMPs (CDC, 
2017; Finklea et al., 2014; Gau & Brooke, 2017; Kentucky General Assembly, 2012). In 
addition to previous academic and organizational claims of success for PDMPs, future 
policymakers should add the current findings to research encouraging the implementation 
of PDMPs. If future research can determine the reason(s) behind increases in heroin and 
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synthetic opioid overdose rates, likely cost and purity of the drugs, then policy 
considerations should be made to combat the supply of these drugs (Alpert et al., 2017; 
Cicero et al., 2014). 
Future Research 
Research by Alpert et al. (2017) and Cicero et al. (2014) indicate that drug price, 
purity, and availability drive opioid addicts to make the switch to heroin and synthetic 
opioids use. A review of the data from this study clearly shows a dramatic increase in 
heroin and synthetic opioid overdose fatalities beginning near the implementation of 
HB1. Although this study clearly absolves HB1 of any culpability for the increase, 
something changed around the same time period to drive this shift in opioid abuse. Future 
research could attempt to identify other sources for encouraging this change.  
Naloxone has become more available within the last decade. Future research 
testing relationships between naloxone and overdose rates could lead to a better 
understanding of the drug meant to reverse opioid overdose incidents. During my 
research for this study, I spoke to an emergency room nurse who explained that some 
opioid overdose fatality incidents occurred after having been previously revived with 
naloxone. She explained that when revived, the addict no longer feels the intoxicating 
effects of the opioid, so they add more of the drug into their bodies. This addition can 





 The current study has positive social implications at the individual, family, and 
societal levels. First, individuals who are addicted to prescription opioids need access to 
safer options. It appears that addicts have, for whatever reason, made a switch from 
prescription opioids to the unregulated and more dangerous illicit opioids, heroin and 
synthetic opioids. Foreseeing this need for options could lead to better policies with 
stronger incentives to seek addiction treatment rather than continue down the path of 
addiction. 
 In 2017, drug overdoses took more than 70,000 lives. 68% of those deaths were 
opioid related (CDC, n.d.). This statistic has overwhelming implications at the family and 
societal levels. Each opioid overdose death has implications at the family level because 
each victim has family members who are affected by the epidemic. Each victim is 
potentially leaving a mother, father, child, or many other family members to deal with the 
emotional toll of their death. 
 It has been estimated that the opioid epidemic has cost the United States more 
than one trillion dollars between the years 2001 and 2017 (Litton, 2018). This number 
implies enormous societal implications for positive social change. The estimation clearly 
indicates that the cost of the opioid epidemic is expensive to say the least. If an 
appropriate portion of this expense could be directed toward encouraging opioid addicts 
to receive treatment, rather than switch to heroin and synthetic opioids, we might see a 
decline in overdose deaths. The overall implications for positive social change could be 




 This study was conducted to identify and quantify possible relationships between 
the implementation of Kentucky’s HB1 and opioid overdose fatality rates. Kentucky’s 
HB1 was intended to influence prescribing rates for all prescription drugs. After the 
implementation of HB1, heroin and fentanyl overtook prescription opioids as the number 
one drug identified in medical examiners’ overdose toxicology reports (Office of the 
State Medical Examiner, n.d.). After HB1 was implemented, the supply and demand for 
heroin and synthetic opioids appear to have increased. This was determined by studying 
the arrest rates for trafficking and possession of heroin and synthetic opioids. 
 This study determined that HB1 ultimately acted as intended. Although the 
prescribing rate in Jefferson County, Kentucky declined, the decrease was not found to be 
directly related to the implementation Of HB1. However, the secondary, and most 
important, intention of HB1 was realized. The decrease in prescription opioid overdose 
fatalities was found to be directly related to the implementation of HB1. 
To incite true positive social change, it must be recognized when public policy 
encourages positive social results. HB1 appears to have been validated by this study. The 
bill achieved the goal of saving lives. In addition to this recognition, however, it must be 
admitted that there was still a dramatic increase in heroin and synthetic opioid overdose 
rates in the past decade. Something encouraged this change. Researchers must not only 
continue to search for the sources of the change, but also effective responses to the 
change. It could be argued that finding the root cause of opioid abuse in specific 
populations would point us in the right direction for finding solutions. 68% of more than 
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70,000 drug overdose fatalities in 2017 were opioid related (CDC, n.d.). This statistic 
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For the ARIMA(0, 1, 0) model, a significant ACF was found in lag 1 (p = 0.047, 
Table A3) and hence the assumption of independence of residuals was violated. For the 
ARIMA(1,1,0) model, the normality assumption was violated (Table A2). 
 
Table A1.  
Results of ITS Analysis of Mortality of Opioids 
  Coefficient SE t p R2 
ARIMA(0, 1, 0) Intercept (β0) -8.000 21.091 -.379 .718 0.673 
 Baseline trend (β1) 6.000 5.740 1.045 .336  





 Trend change after 
intervention (β3) 
.143 6.509 .022 .983  
ARIMA(1, 1, 0) Intercept (β0) -8.828 16.110 -.548 .607 0.776 
 Baseline trend (β1) 5.826 4.433 1.314 .246  





 Trend change after 
intervention (β3) 
.139 4.602 .030 .977  
Note: SE = standard error, t = t statistic, p = p value. 
 
Table A2. 
Results of Shapiro-Wilk Tests 
 W df p 
ARIMA(0, 1, 0) 0.953 10 0.699 














Table A3.  
ACFs and PACFs for the Residuals  
Box-Ljung statistic 
 





(0, 1, 0) 
1 -.544 .316 3.944 1 .047 -.544 .316 
 2 -.013 .399 3.947 2 .139 -.439 .316 
 3 .087 .399 4.077 3 .253 -.285 .316 
 4 -.241 .401 5.239 4 .264 -.624 .316 
 5 .413 .415 9.330 5 .097 -.332 .316 
 6 -.171 .454 10.207 6 .116 -.186 .316 
 7 -.124 .461 10.820 7 .147 -.240 .316 
 8 .116 .464 11.621 8 .169 -.257 .316 
ARIMA 
(1, 1, 0) 
1 -.254 .316 .860 1 .354 -.254 .316 
 2 -.329 .336 2.481 2 .289 -.420 .316 
 3 -.020 .367 2.488 3 .477 -.319 .316 
 4 -.083 .367 2.626 4 .622 -.506 .316 
 5 .424 .369 6.944 5 .225 .073 .316 
 6 -.078 .415 7.125 6 .309 -.041 .316 
 7 -.268 .416 9.990 7 .189 -.062 .316 















For the ARIMA(0, 1, 0), ARIMA(1, 1, 0), ARIMA(1, 1, 1) models, the normality 
assumption was violated (Table B2). 
 
Table B1.  
Results of ITS Analysis of Mortality of Opioids 
  Coefficient SE t p R2 
ARIMA(0, 1, 0) Intercept (β0) -9.600 45.567 -.211 .840 0.938 
 Baseline trend (β1) 3.600 12.402 .290 .781  
 Level change after 
intervention (β2) 
-27.667 34.710 -.797 .456  
 Trend change after 
intervention (β3) 
14.429 14.062 1.026 .344  
ARIMA(1, 1, 0) Intercept (β0) -8.809 50.566 -.174 .869 0.938 
 Baseline trend (β1) 3.314 13.739 .241 .819  
 Level change after 
intervention (β2) 
-26.408 38.619 -.684 .524  
 Trend change after 
intervention (β3) 
14.601 15.714 .929 .395  
ARIMA(1, 1, 1) Intercept (β0) -15.182 54.722 -.277 .795 0.947 
 Baseline trend (β1) -.994 32.891 -.030 .977  
 Level change after 
intervention (β2) 
5.498 14.540 .378 .725  
 Trend change after 
intervention (β3) 
-37.993 40.013 -.950 .396  




Table B2.  
Results of Shapiro-Wilk Tests 
 W df p 
ARIMA(0, 1, 0) .788 10 .010 
ARIMA(1, 1, 0) .765 10 .005 


















ACFs and PACFs for the Residuals  
Box-Ljung statistic 




(0, 1, 0) 
1 .040 .316 .021 1 .885 .040 .316 
 2 -.611 .317 5.620 2 .060 -.613 .316 
 3 -.166 .418 6.093 3 .107 -.165 .316 
 4 .193 .425 6.836 4 .145 -.289 .316 
 5 .091 .433 7.035 5 .218 -.212 .316 
 6 -.042 .435 7.087 6 .313 -.203 .316 
 7 -.017 .436 7.098 7 .419 -.166 .316 
 8 .008 .436 7.102 8 .526 -.175 .316 
ARIMA 
(1, 1, 0) 
1 .029 .316 .011 1 .915 .029 .316 
 2 -.598 .316 5.381 2 .068 -.600 .316 
 3 -.159 .414 5.814 3 .121 -.177 .316 
 4 .183 .420 6.483 4 .166 -.283 .316 
 5 .086 .428 6.660 5 .247 -.215 .316 
 6 -.037 .430 6.702 6 .349 -.203 .316 
 7 -.014 .430 6.710 7 .460 -.167 .316 
 8 .007 .430 6.713 8 .568 -.174 .316 
ARIMA 
(1, 1, 1) 
1 -.116 .316 .181 1 .671 -.116 .316 
 2 -.479 .320 3.620 2 .164 -.499 .316 
 3 -.083 .385 3.738 3 .291 -.304 .316 
 4 .146 .387 4.166 4 .384 -.269 .316 
 5 .096 .393 4.386 5 .495 -.195 .316 
 6 -.065 .395 4.513 6 .608 -.235 .316 
 7 -.007 .396 4.515 7 .719 -.139 .316 



















Figure B6. Figures of ACFs (right) and PACFs (left) for the residuals (ARIMA(1, 1, 1)). 
